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Abstract: An exposition on a new regulatory theory; Common law courts as regulators – 
the judiciary as a regulatory mechanism. In this paper the author ascribes to the 
judiciary/courts specific regulatory powers with regards to fundamental rights, the Bill of 
Rights and upholding and adjudicating constitutional norms. Via judicial regulation, courts 
can exercise power outside of the lis in disputes of distinction.  
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Common law courts as regulators, 
an exposition:  
The Judiciary as a regulatory mechanism 
 
 
 
 
Constitutional law is the law of the powers and responsibilities of the main branches of 
government, and of the relationship among them; constitutional law is the law of human 
rights and freedoms. Under this understanding of constitutional law, there is constitutional 
law even without a written constitution… The relevant question is: …What is the court's 
contribution? What problems does this contribution pose for the courts? How is the judicial 
discretion exercised?1  
The Hon. Justice Aharon Barak, Supreme Court of Israel (May 1987) 
 
 
I Introduction and New Regulatory Outlook 
 
[1] This paper boldly concludes that courts regulate constitutional rights. As 
such, some may be nonplussed and attribute to its author little in the way 
of revolutionary legal scholarship. 'Do Courts regulate?' appears to the 
uninitiated a rhetorical question because when courts make decisions, 
and decisions are regulations, then courts must be regulators. And so the 
syllogistic answer to the above question is superficially yes; of course 
courts are regulators, and, "So what?" 2  However, therein lies an 
overlooked consideration; although clearly courts do regulate, what is 
meant by regulation in the judicial context and where does that power 
originate? What exactly do courts regulate and is it a legitimate exercise, 
or a mislabeling of judicial activism?3 Courts will regulate at certain times 
and not all decisions are regulations, some decisions are in a 
                                                 
1 Justice Aharon Barak "Constitutional Law Without a Constitution: The Role of The Judiciary" in Shimon 
Shetreet (ed) The Role of Courts in Society (Kluwer Academic Publishers, The Netherlands, 1988) 448 at 449. 
2 The syllogism suffers from a clear fatal flaw and the question is no longer rhetorical. A syllogism is a form 
of deductive argument based on a conclusion following from two (or more), asserted or assumed truthful – 
although not necessarily so, propositions.  
3 Frederick Schauer "Do Cases Make Bad Law?" (2006) 73 U Chi L Rev 913 at 915; and Emily Sherwin 
"Judges as Rulemakers" (2006) 73 U Chi L Rev 919 at 921. 
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constitutional or rights class and are further identifiable as a 'lis of 
distinction'4 in their regulatory import. A judicial regulatory mechanism 
exists which can further rebut the rhetorical sentiment – 'Do Courts 
regulate?' This paper is an exposition of the judiciary as a regulatory 
mechanism and acknowledges an unsubstantiated norm that common 
law courts, like other classical regulators, regulate directly and that the 
judiciary regulates specifically in the rights and constitutional arena wider 
than the lis in particular inter se 5  disputes. I use four illustrations, 
comparative jurisprudence, and the descriptive reasoning necessary of a 
new theory in regulatory law.  
 
[2] Throughout this exposition I explore rights-based constitutionalism 
from a regulatory perspective. I argue that traditional common law and 
judicial conceptualisations of the legal system and New Zealand's 
constitution are regulatory in nature. The courts’ regulatory mechanism 
is the protection of aggregate, often fundamental, rights through legal 
actions - the lis - which affects society much wider than the individual lis 
between inter partes. Courts can regulate social rights en mass via a lis of 
distinction. An "essential difference is that the ambit of judicial law-
making is narrower than that of parliamentary law-making" 6  and I 
identify the judiciary specifically regulating fundamental and 
constitutional rights as a legitimate function.7 It is for the judiciary to 
manage the domain of rights as a regulatory exercise, "the legislative role 
of the Courts is interstitial… [t]hey effect just and efficient legislative 
outcomes in ways that reconcile the institutional values of the legal 
system".8 The judicial regulatory mechanism is only identifiable with an 
understanding of the inherent political nature of law and the judicial 
enterprise, of which this paper explores. 
 
[3] In summary I propose a new regulatory theory ascribed to the courts and 
judiciary, where they are a regulatory mechanism, and regulate rights 
with a broad mandate between parties; in society; aggregate rights; 
human rights and Bill of Rights 1990 rights. Courts are not judicial 
activists or judicial supremacists,9 in the pejorative sense, as there is a 
"fundamental political-judicial dialogue that secures the constitutional 
                                                 
4 Lis or lis pendens meaning a lawsuit or formal notice of pending legal action: John Gray Lawyers' Latin: A 
Vade Mecum (Robert Hale, London, 2006). A lis of distinction is a phrase I have coined to describe and 
demarcate a lis of particular importance to common law courts as regulators theory, for example "there are 
many lis' but few lis' of distinction in relation to rights regulation".  
5 Inter se or inter partes meaning between the parties or amongst themselves. See Gray, above n 4. 
6 Phillip A Joseph "Parliament, the Courts, and the Collaborative Enterprise"(2004) 15 KCLJ 321 at 338. 
7 At 345. 
8 At 345. 
9 R Ekins "Judicial Supremacy and the Rule of Law" (2003) 119 LQR 127 at 127. 
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balance" 10  as evidenced though the judicial regulatory mechanism 
explored in this paper. In other words, common law courts, as rights’ 
regulators, serve a legitimate function within the common law world. 
Courts regulate conduct more generally than the State v Citizen lis, so that 
in a lis of distinction,11 by adjudicating a rights dispute between A v B, 
the judiciary make social policy precedent far wider than the inter se/inter 
partes dispute before them. This is a new theory in regulatory discourse; 
the judiciary as, or exercising, a distinct regulatory mechanism. I do not 
seek to provide direct rebuttal to skeptics of common-law 
constitutionalism or Bill of Rights interpretation.12 Orthodox theorists 
may always ascribe some illegitimacy to constitutional/supremacy 
regulation by the judiciary, 13  and the orthodoxy fails to address a 
legitimate reproach to its attack on constitutionalism. This exposition 
presents regulatory motivations which are neither activist nor 
supremacist in nature thus making this new theory worthy of exploration. 
A Outlook on the Classical Regulators 
[4] Outside the wide folds of the Commerce Act 1986 14  'courts as 
regulators' appears an unwieldy concept, insofar as the regulatory body, 
the courts, are not directed to regulate, mandated or ascribed regulatory 
powers in a demarcated area such as the Commerce Commission. 
Common law Courts must wait for a lis to be brought. They cannot 
regulate or investigate of their own accord like many traditional 
regulators or some Civil law inquisitorial courts. 15  The Commerce 
Commission is a classical regulator. It undertakes agency activity 
regulating prices under its Act16 and is distinct from broader notions of 
regulation. It exists in its own “regulatory area” with “boundaries which 
demarcate regulatory space…encompassing a range of regulatory issues 
                                                 
10 Joseph "Parliament, the Courts, and the Collaborative Enterprise", above n 6, at 345. 
11 For the definition of "lis of distinction" see above n 4.  
12 For an example of the debate erring on the side against common-law constitutionalists see Ekins, above 
n 9. 
13 Christopher Forsyth and Linda Whittle "Judicial Creativity and Judicial Legitimacy in Administrative 
Law" (2002) 8 Canta LR 453 at 459–460; Andrew Halpin "The Theoretical Controversy concerning 
Judicial Review" (2001) 64 MLR 500; and Conor Gearty "Reconciling Parliamentary Democracy and 
Human Rights" (2002) 118 LQR 248. 
14 Part 1 focusing on the Commerce Commission, Part 2 Restrictive trade practices, Part 3 Acquisitions, 
Part 4 Regulated goods and services.  
15 Commerce Act 1986, s 74B. See for example the French Juge D'Instruction: Jacqueline Hodgson "The 
Police, the Prosecutor and the Juge D'Instruction: Judicial Supervision in France, Theory and Practice" 
(2001) 42 Brit J Criminol 342. 
16 See the definition of Price Fixing in Commerce Act 1986, s 30, and Part 2 'Restrictive trade practices'. 
See also J Black "Talking about regulation" in Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung (ed) An Introduction to 
Law and Regulation (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007) 176 at 181, where at [4.3.1] the author 
outlines observational studies of agency behaviour. 
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in a community”.17 Whereas courts regulate our private and public or 
state interactions through tort, contract and administrative law, having 
superior jurisdiction over the "general laws".18 In New Zealand ("NZ"), 
one does not normatively speak of regulation by the courts, due to their 
unrestricted demarcation/jurisdiction over all law. I suggest otherwise. 
The courts, like the Commerce Commission, have exceedingly wide 
regulatory reach when a lis is brought before it; both can be omnipresent 
regulators, with their reach touching on almost all areas of society.19 I 
focus in particular on courts regulation of rights and constitutional 
norms as a demarcated area. 
 
[5] In a Legal Systems course,20 to answer the question 'what do courts do?' 
with the statement, 'they regulate' at first glance demonstrates a 
fundamental misunderstanding of both stare decisis21 and a Westminster 
model of parliamentary sovereignty.22 A prime-facie regulatory answer 
                                                 
17 Ayres and Braithwaite "Responsive regulation" (1992) in Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung (ed) An 
Introduction to Law and Regulation (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007) 54 at 63–64. 
18 When I use the term 'courts' in the paper I am referring to the members of the High Court bench and 
above. Members of the District Court bench are of "inferior jurisdiction" and their powers stem from 
statute not the common law – although this does not mean they cannot regulate: see District Court Act 
1947, s 29; and Judicature Act 1908, s 2 definition of "inferior court". All Judges of the High Court, Court 
of Appeal and Supreme Court have a general supervisory jurisdiction stemming from common law and 
those courts are constituted as supreme courts of judicature: Judicature Act 1908, s 16.  
19 Commerce Act 1986, s 1A: "The purpose of this Act is to promote competition in markets for the long-
term benefit of consumers within New Zealand", the Commission has exceedingly wide scope in order to 
achieve that aim for example Part 2 'Restrictive Trade Practices' which can apply to both small and large 
business. 
20 The simplest explanation of a legal system is often the most telling and informative, it starts with the 
basic building blocks such as rule of law and the separation of powers. At Victoria University of 
Wellington the course is entitled 'LAWS121 Introduction to New Zealand Legal System'. At the University 
of Auckland the paper is 'LAWS121G Law and Society' both having Grant Morris Law Alive: The New 
Zealand Legal System in Context (3rd ed, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2015) as recommended text. It 
was with the 1st edition of that book and the 14th edition of Glanville Williams and ATH Smith ed Glanville 
Williams: Learning the Law (14th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2010) which I started my legal education. 
Learning the Law is now on its 15th edition, first published in 1945, it has been a staple text in the Common 
Law universities most notable for coining the topic of "the English Legal System": Peter Clinch Teaching 
Legal Research (2nd ed, UK Centre for Legal Education, University of Warwick, Coventry, 2006) at 13. 
21 Judges created the common law however the concept of regulation does not fit entirely with stare decisis 
as very few regulators are bound by a strict system a precedent, non-court regulation is unlikely to be 
cumulative in the strict precedential sense – more in line with jurisprudence constante, there is regulation and it 
is made and applied consistently but it can be changed. Of common law regulation and common law 
decision making Justice McHugh remarked in Perre v Apand Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 36, 198 CLR 180 "[T]hat is 
the way of the common law, the judges preferring to go 'from case to case, like the ancient Mediterranean 
mariners, hugging the coast from point to point, and avoiding the dangers of the open sea of system or 
science.'" The phrase origionally coined by Lord Wright "The Study of Law" (1938) 54 LQR 185 at 186.  
22 Post the United Kingdom's acceptance of the ECHR it would be technically incorrect to compare NZ 
and the UK jurisdictions as both operating along the lines of parliamentary supremacy, although they both 
are based on the Westminster system: Walter Bagehot The English Constitution (Chapman & Hall, London, 
1867) at 187 and 212.  
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may be applicable to jurisdictions with a supreme-law constitution such 
as the USA and Germany, where superior courts such as the United 
States Supreme Court ("US SC") and the German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht 23  are able to regulate on constitutional 
grounds, and have immense power over, and stemming from, their 
constitution.24 Such courts regulate by blocking, critiquing and, in certain 
instances, creating new substantive laws of the state; promulgating 
orders and striking down laws and on an 'is or is not constitutional' test. 
NZ courts do not directly ask what 'is or is not' constitutional, and do 
not classically regulate from that perspective. NZ courts lack the direct 
power to do so due to our constitutional foundations. Regulatory power 
is inherently exercised by a court through its constitutionalism25 its place 
in society and its system of adjudication of rights and obligations. NZ's 
Supreme Court (and Privy Council/Court of Appeal before 2003) sits at 
the apex of appellate constitutional regulation vis-à-vis rights, state and 
citizen. Even without supreme law constitutionalism, NZ's outcomes in 
relation to court adjudicated constitutional matters are not so distinct 
from the US SC and any exploration of NZ's courts regulatory 
mechanism merits attention from a comparative perspective. 
 
[6] Ostensibly the predominate and classical regulatory powers are the 
executive and legislative branches of government. Conceptually when 
regulation works, individuals and firms are induced to outcomes, which 
in the absence of the regulatory instrument they would not have attained, 
or attained as quickly or to such a degree.26 This is both a regulatory 
function and aim of those branches. Yet, confirmed by Professor Ogus, 
an oft overlooked and underlying regulatory branch is the judiciary.27 In 
as much as Ogus confirms the courts are an overlooked regulatory 
branch, meriting of further scholarship, I argue that courts, whether 
appellate or first-instance, 28  whilst traditionally considered as 
adjudicators of disputes inter se also have a general constitutional function 
                                                 
23 The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (BVerfG). 
24 Ogus "Comparing regulatory systems: Institutions, processes and legal forms in industrialised countries" 
in Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung (ed) An Introduction to Law and Regulation (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2007) 135 at 138. 
25 Constitutionalism is an adherence to a system of constitutional government – I further discuss this image, 
and the extent of its adherence, in relation to New Zealand's constitutional norms and the function/role of 
the court i.e. its constitutionalism. 
26 Ogus "Comparing regulatory systems: Institutions, processes and legal forms in industrialised countries", 
above n 24, at 135.  
27 At 135. 
28 Technically the res is different at first instance than on appeal, unless the appeal is heard under the de novo 
exception as the judgment reads Valerie Morse v The Police [2011] NZSC 45 even if the de novo rule was not 
actually applied in that case (Morse is discussed in Part III (K)). For the purposes of this paper I look to the 
wider issue of the dispute as opposed to the specific appeal pleadings and leave the issue of the distinction 
between judicial regulators at first instances versus appeals courts to another paper. 
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of regulating both societal conduct and the conduct of governments. 
This is over and above the delineated economic actions to which Ogus 
refers. I suggest that an underlying intent for the court as part of its 
constitutional regulatory function is to achieve an aggregate social best 
result in constitutional matters, far broader than resolving a particular lis 
between Person A v Person B, or Citizen v State. Secondly; the judiciary, as a 
branch of government and society, regulate via self-imposed and self-
regulated discretion in a manner discrete from archetypal regulatory 
bodies, 29  which makes them a particularly powerful regulatory 
mechanism and one worthy of due recognition. 
B Structure of this Exposition 
[7] This paper, in four parts, outlines the fiat that 'courts regulate' to further 
a nascent exposition of the judiciary as a regulatory mechanism and to 
provoke further discussion in the subject area; what is this regulatory 
mechanism that courts possess? I present four illustrations of judicial 
regulatory conduct, lis' of distinction far beyond the broad traditional 
brocade of common law theory that judges 'make law'.30 In other words 
"judges have much scope for agency in their decision making".31 This 
paper is in part a political science based challenge, in that it recognises 
the political nature of law, to the legal scholarship model that "tends to 
examine the quality of legal reasoning, focusing on whether a court 
reached the correct decision or whether its opinion provides legal 
certainty", and a regulatory analysis of public law and adjudicative 
theories.32 This 'new' regulatory theory is multidisciplinary in nature. 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
29 Ayres and Braithwaite, above n 17, at 56: The authors describe classical enforcement regulatory agencies. 
NZ examples would include the Commerce Commission, Financial Markets Authority and the Takeovers 
Board. 
30 Of the brocade Glanville Williams above n 18, at 24, suggests "Occasionally, however, the invocation of 
the common law refers not to previously existing law but to the power of the judges to create law under 
the guise of interpreting it"; Aharon Barak The Judge in a Democracy (Princeton University Press, Princeton 
2009) at 155, Chapter 6 discusses the development of the common law and the idea of the common law as 
judge made law. This can be contrasted against the common law "myth" of judges discovering the law See: 
Frédéric Gilles Sourgens A Nascent Common Law (Koninklijke Brill NV, The Netherlands, 2014) at 28; See 
also Jeffery Goldsworthy "The Myth of the Common Law Constitution" in Douglas E Edlin (ed) Common 
Law Theory (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007) 204; Jeffrey A Segal and Harold J Spaeth The 
Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002). 
31 Ronda L Evans and Sean Fern "From Applications to Appeals: A Political Science Perspective on the 
New Zealand Supreme Court's Dockets" in Mary-Rose Russell and Matthew Barber (ed) The Supreme Court 
of New Zealand: 2004-2013 (Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2015) 33 at 35. 
32 At 35. 
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II Constitutional Norms  
 
[8] Courts and judiciary often act as national risk and right allocation-
systems,33 either apportioning risks individually between Person A v B, 
Citizen v State, or in certain constitutional cases regulating outside the lis 
and realigning rights and risks between the State v All Citizens. Allocating 
risk(s) and reward(s) 34  is a foundational regulatory function and the 
courts must do so with due respect to the norms of the constitutional 
system. 
 
[9] The judicial mechanism sews this function in large swathes via 
constitutional adjudication. A citizen may take a lis against the state 
which leads to a change in the interaction/rights/obligations between all 
citizens and the state – leading to an outcome outside of the lis inter se. 
The national risk system analysis takes into account the cultural and 
constitutional context of the regime 35  because the court regulation 
mechanism is both a product of, and regulator of, the regime. Morgan 
and Yeung adopt the approach of regulation being inherent in, and 
brought to the fore by, "political and constitutional context…the social 
structures and institutions that allocate power".36 The courts are a deus ex 
machina in a non-theatrical sense;37 they are from and for the constitution 
and exist to apportion resolutions to constitutional and rights problems. 
However the judicial regulatory mechanism is not infallible as the courts 
are not 'cure all' corrective devices38 - courts regulate some of the time 
and regulate well even less. Not all law is regulation, especially in this 
regulatory analysis of public and adjudicative legal theories. 
 
                                                 
33 Ogus "Regulation" (2004) in Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung (ed) An Introduction to Law and Regulation 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007) 18 at 24. 
34 Karen Yeung "Government by publicity management: Sunlight or spin? Regulatory instruments and 
techniques - publicising compliance performance ("exclamation and excoriation")" (2005) in Bronwen 
Morgan and Karen Yeung (ed) An Introduction to Law and Regulation (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2007) 96 and 143 at 100-101. 
35 Ogus "Comparing regulatory systems: Institutions, processes and legal forms in industrialised countries" 
above n 24, at 135. 
36 Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung "Introduction" in Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung (ed) An 
Introduction to Law and Regulation (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007) 1 at 4. 
37 'God from the machine': Edward Stringham Private Governance: Creating Order in Economic and Social Life 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015) at 10. 
38 At 10. 
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C Define 'Constitutional Norm'? 
[10] A comparison, and evaluation of scope and/or effectiveness can be 
drawn between two "national risk systems"39 (jurisdictions). The ways in 
which each jurisdiction regulates conduct via the courts will differ due to 
the constitutional basis, or norms, of the system. A comparison will be 
superficial if "no account is taken of the cultural and constitutional 
context in which the regime is to be found".40 A basic norm is a rule, 
principle or socio-legal context that underlies the foundation of the legal 
system. I use the term more liberally than Kelsen in so far as there are 
norms within the NZ constitutional framework and society, which, when 
brought together, form the 'norms' of the NZ legal system – I do not 
subscribe to a single or superior grundnorm.41 As discussed later, it is an 
entirely subjective viewpoint whether Parliamentary Sovereignty is NZ's 
grundnorm, or whether Parliamentary Sovereignty is absolute or 
ostensive. In a rhetorical sense, the various substantive constitutional 
norms, inter alia; a free and independent judiciary and the Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 et al are those without which we would have no system, or a 
wholly different system. The judicial mechanism is both a norm, and 
creature of the norms – this is key to understanding the exposition. 
 
[11] Judicial adjudication "…may depend not only on the merits of the 
applicants and the use of highly detailed legislative or administrative 
criteria…" but also on the basis of the system, the aforementioned 
"substantive constitutional norms" that exist alongside other significant 
considerations. 42  The "cultural variables of the system" or "national 
peculiarities", as Hancher and Moran explain, inform both regulation 
and the regulatory system, as fundamentally, "place matters". 43  
Regulation, and the courts mechanism, is therefore the reason for, and a 
product of the court system, the court itself, why the court system was 
created, and the underlying social norms, the "national peculiarities", in 
the context of society, and has informed its past historical development. 
In terms of sewing a basis for a courts regulatory mechanism, it is 
primarily found in the jurisdiction’s constitution writ large, written or 
                                                 
39 Ogus "Comparing regulatory systems: Institutions, processes and legal forms in industrialised countries" 
above n 24, at 135. 
40 At 135. 
41 Hans Kelsen Pure Theory of Law (University of California Press, California, 1967); H. L. A Hart would 
describe these norms as the "living reality of the system" and either explanation is fine: H. L. A Hart The 
Concept of Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1961) at 293; Although W. B. Simpson Reflections on the Concept of 
Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) at 127, outlines that the idea validity of 'norms' as derivative 
of a superior grundnom as "the ultimate riciculus mus".  
42 Ogus "Comparing regulatory systems: Institutions, processes and legal forms in industrialised countries" 
above n 24, at135. 
43 Hancher and Moran "Organizing regulatory space" (1989) in Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung (ed) 
An Introduction to Law and Regulation (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007) 54 and 106 at 65. 
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unwritten. If a court system is "simply an instrument facilitating 
government control of the economy" versus a system "enshrine[ing] a 
general principle of freedom of economic activity",44 then the way in 
which the mechanism deals with decidedly non-economic questions, 
regulating questions and outcomes 'rights based' in nature will generally 
follow similar lines. All instances of adjudication are informed by the 
peculiarities of the place and historical development of the adjudication 
system.  
 
[12] The judicial regulator's role is "…enforcing rights to property, to 
exchanges of property, and of policing the simple and complex exchange 
processes among competing free men".45 This is part of the Hobbesian 
tradition, which informs constitutional norms, whereby a court system is 
required to regulate the market to avoid chaos.46 The court system in the 
regulatory context is best viewed as a market, and on an extended 
Hobbesian view regulating both commercial and other more 'human', 
rights. What is important is that this 'market' is contextual, and exists 
influenced by societal norms. 
 
D From Great Constitutional Constraint Comes Great Regulatory Power 
[13] The executive and the legislature are both constrained by the 
constitution and from this constraint the judiciary gains regulatory 
force. 47  By enforcing constitutional constraints against expanding 
intrusive regulation 48  into citizens' rights, emanating from the 
government/legislative/executive (be it economic or social regulation), 
the judicial branch is itself creating regulation by upholding, altering or 
furthering social, or rights based norms. From the US perspective 
"…this will depend on the set of politico-economic values to which that 
[Constitutional] document gives expression…"49 By contrast, the NZ 
                                                 
44 At 65. 
45 James Buchanan The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 
1975) at 163. 
46 Thomas Hobbes Leviathan: Or, The Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil (4th ed, 
George Rutledge and Sons, London, 1894) at 197: "…any by this means destroying all laws, both divine 
and human, reduce all order, government, and society to the first chaos of violence and civil war". 
47 Regulatory force within the judicial branch is, within a common law society, also inherent. For example 
the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, which in NZ exists and preexists the constraint on the Executive via 
the Habeas Corpus Act 2001. In s 5(a) the first purpose of the Act is stated as "to reaffirm the historic and 
constitutional purpose of the writ of habeas corpus as a vital means of safeguarding individual liberty:", the 
fourth purpose of the Act is to "(d) abolish writs of habeas corpus other than the writ of habeas corpus ad 
subjiciendum."  
48 I define regulation in part F. 
49 Ogus "Comparing regulatory systems: Institutions, processes and legal forms in industrialised countries" 
above n 24, at 136. 
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constitution is unwritten and our courts must take an "open textured 
approach" to constitutional matters.50  
 
[14] The parameters of NZ's constitution are undefined and at its core, 
interpretation rests on socio legal context and on a malleable set of 
documents and contextual analysis, for example the Judicature Act 1908 
and the Treaty of Waitangi. This is a type of administrative regulation via 
"methods of statutory interpretation that seek to protect 
underrepresented interests or that force[s] explicit deliberation and 
disclosure"51 in an extended sense. In essence it requires both an open 
conversation of what is the constitution and what is in the constitution 
and which parts are applicable to the regulatory endeavor. This is in 
contrast to the style of written regulation, as found in the Commerce Act 
1986 and promulgated by its Commission, which tends to have a high 
level of precision in order to protect against writ-large judicial 
interpretation and is therefore formulated in very specific terms.52 NZ 
courts "continue to uphold the principle of comity [with Parliament] 
while acknowledging the necessity for judicial sovereignty [in BORA 
matters]." 53  The very point of our "open textured" approach is to 
provide for the undefined parameters, this does not mean it is any less 
precise on application – or not regulatory – it is a discernably different 
methodology formulated due to the context of NZ norms and the 
context of the Constitutional Regulator: the Judiciary.  
 
[15] The Judiciary, as Regulator, acts as a duel functionary both as a 
regulatory implementer and a regulatory designer.54 Uniquely it is the 
Regulator (judiciary) who adopted, formulated and implemented the 
"open-textured" approach.55 The regulatory power in the NZ judicial 
mechanism emanates from the open textured constitution which 
necessitated a similar approach be taken towards a fundamental 
                                                 
50 The phrase possibly first coined by Paul Rishworth "Human Rights - from the Top" (1997) 60 Modern 
Law Review 171; See also Mark Henaghan "The changes to final appeals in New Zealand since the creation 
of the New Zealand Supreme Court" (2011) 12 Otago Law Review 579, where the author uses the phrase 
an umpteen number of times. "Open textured" is now part of the New Zealand legal lexicon.  
51 Stephen Croley "Theories of regulation: Incorporating the administrative process" (1998) in Bronwen 
Morgan and Karen Yeung (ed) An Introduction to Law and Regulation (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2007) 44 at 46. 
52 Ogus "Comparing regulatory systems: Institutions, processes and legal forms in industrialised countries" 
above n 24, at 139. 
53 Petra Butler "Bill of Rights" in Mary-Rose Russell and Matthew Barber (ed) The Supreme Court of  New 
Zealand: 2004-2013 (Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2015) 255 at 256. 
54 Hancher and Moran "Organizing regulatory space" above n 43, at 62 and 66; Tony Prosser "Nationalised 
industries and public Control" (1986) in Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung (ed) An Introduction to Law and 
Regulation (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007) 37 at 40. 
55 See Rishworth "Human Rights – From the Top" above n 50; Henaghan "The changes to final appeals in 
New Zealand since the creation of the New Zealand Supreme Court" above n 50. 
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constitutional norm, the Bill of Rights Act. This gives a flavor of a 
different style of power, admittedly less awe inspiring, and more indirect 
than the judiciary in countries with an entrenched and supreme 
constitution. The judiciaries' power is less self-effacing. The result is that 
in NZ there is scope for inclusion or exclusion of constitutional norms. 
Therefore the ultimate composition(s) of the constitution by the 
judiciary in a lis of distinction/constitutional importance is formulated by 
both an "open textured" approach to BORA, and the constitution itself, 
as the approach and the judicial mechanism is part of the constitution. 
The US SC has supreme-law power, exercised conspicuously by 
annulling legislation,56 far in excess of NZ's superior courts. However 
arguably NZ courts have greater interpretive scope, for example 
interpreting the ability of citizens to carry firearms in the context of the 
twenty-first-century. Such rights are not enshrined in a document and 
are therefore limited in interpretive scope.57 Therein lies an element of 
the NZ judicial mechanism: greater interpretive discretion weighted 
against less power. This regulatory "imprecision is consistent with the 
natural desires of judges to leave themselves…flexibility in future 
cases".58  
 
[16] NZ, as one of only three countries in the world with an unwritten 
constitution,59 cannot be accused of inadequate constitutional legislative 
provision, but successful constitutional regulation by the courts. The 
unwritten and open textured approach to our constitution, imprecise in 
nature, and possibly wide in scope, is a conscious choice by all branches 
of government. Codification and proclamation could be undertaken 
most easily via common law dicta. This was done by Cooke P, in 
enumerating the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi,60 in the Lands Case, 
itself an exercise of the judicial regulatory mechanism. Codification writ 
large is not the norm in NZ due to the appreciation of contextualisation 
in NZ constitutionalism. A cynic might argue that there was no 
appreciation of contextualization in situations like s 9 of the State 
                                                 
56 Ogus "Comparing regulatory systems: Institutions, processes and legal forms in industrialised countries" 
above n 24, at 138: Ogus comments that there is a persuasive case for the Indian judiciary to be crowned 
most active.  
57 The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution is codified and "…the right of the people to 
keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed", while the US SC can strike down offending legislation as 
'unconstitutional' and one of its major regulatory roles is to interpret the constitution it is bounded in by 
the documentary fundamentalism inherent in the text. 
58 J. C. Coffee Jr "Paradigms lost: The blurring of the criminal and civil law models - and what can be done 
about it" (1992) in An Introduction to Law and Regulation (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007) 204 
at 206. 
59 The United Kingdom and Israel being the other two. I purposefully do not use the term 'lacking'. 
60 New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-General (the Lands Case) [1987] 1 NZLR 641. 
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Owned Enterprise Act 1986,61 which triggered the Lands Case. Rather, 
Parliament was paying lip service to the Treaty without actually intending 
for the courts to give it substantive legal expression. Yet it was the 
judiciary who decided, in NZ's constitutional dialogue, that it was 
Parliament's intent for the courts to adjudicate that lis (on constitutional 
grounds as opposed to a purely limited inter se adjudication) in NZ's 
constitutional dialogue Parliament's intent is for the courts to the decide. 
Nevertheless the court, acting as regulatory implementer and designer, is 
highly efficient in responding to changing circumstances, and NZ is 
lucky to be afforded such bespoke tailoring. Indeed the Constitutional 
Advisory Panel's key recommendation to the Government was to 
"actively support a continuing conversation about the constitution",62 
and in essence to further develop the contextual and open textured 
nature of NZ's unwritten text.  
 
[17] New Zealanders are not constitutional documentary fundamentalists.63 
On this premise our courts are less encumbered than US counterparts as 
we lack a restrictive document and are free to fetter in our ethereal 
restraints.64 This is enshrined in ss 4 and 5 of our Bill of Rights Act 1990 
("BORA") which provides that other legislative enactments are not 
affected and parliament may place limitations – limitations are justified in 
a free and democratic society - on rights and freedoms. 65 Our open 
textured approach exists in the ebb and flow of s 6 where an 
interpretation consistent with BORA is to be preferred. The judicial 
mechanism can be both hampered by lack of documentary force majeure, 
for it has no supreme-law constitution to fall back on, but strengthened 
                                                 
61 Section 9 provided that the courts must take into account "the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi". 
62  Constitutional Advisory Panel New Zealand's Constitution: A Report on a Conversation, (New Zealand 
Government, 2013) at 9: The report was commissioned by the Hon. Bill English and Hon. Dr Pita 
Sharples, Ministers for Constitutional Affairs. The co-chairs of the report were Emeritus Professor John 
Burrows QC and Sir Tipene O'Regan (Ngai Tahu).  
63 In so far as certain rights exist, such as the right to keep and bear arms, because the context at the time 
the document was written necessitated it' See Morton Horwitz "Foreword: The Constitution of Change: 
Legal Fundamentality without Fundamentalism" (1993) 32 Harvard Law Review 107; See also Dennis J 
Goldford The American Constitution and the Debate Over Originalism (Cambridge University Press, 2005) at 76. 
64 This paper has not focused on the Canadian Charter of Rights, which NZ's BORA was modeled on. The 
Canadian charter is supreme and is highly flexible; see Carter v Canada 2015 SCC 5; See also the quote at the 
start of this paper: Barak "Constitutional Law Without a Constitution: The Role of the Judiciary" above n 1, 
at 449. 
65 It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the interplay of rights limitations in BORA, for example 
whether one subscribes to the Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA) or R v 
Hansen [2007] 3 NZLR 1 (NZSC) test; See Andrew S Butler "Limiting Rights" in Carter and Palmer (ed) 
Essays in Honour of Sir Ivor Richardson (Victoria University of Wellington Press, Wellington, 2002) 113 at 113; 
See also Claudia Geiringer and Steven Price "Moving from Self-Justification to Demonstrable Justification" 
in Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd (ed) Law, Liberty, Legislation (Lexis Nexis, New Zealand, 2008) 295. 
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by the open interpretive scope of its rights regulatory framework.66 This 
is a perplexing balance for which ultimately NZ's apex court will regulate. 
Lord Cooke, on the establishment of the Supreme Court noted the 
"academic (perhaps) question of collision under section 3(2) of the 
Supreme Court Act 2003", that "Nothing in this Act affects New 
Zealand's continuing commitment to the rule of the and the sovereignty 
of Parliament", finding that those two concepts could conceivably 
clash.67  
 
E The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 a Fundamental Norm 
[18] The courts have always been required to perform a gap-filling role of 
pronouncement of applicability and enforcement,68 and indeed to self 
populate NZ's rights mechanism. The government enacted selected 
preexisting common law rights into statute law 69  without a private-
enforcement mechanism in the statute. Minister Palmer, 70  when 
formulating the policy behind BORA, did not specify an enforcement 
mechanism for the rights contained in the Act nor any quantum(s) of 
damages, should they even be available. This came later when the court 
regulated executive conduct/abuses in Baigents Case. 71  The private 
enforcement mechanism of the various rights contained in BORA arose 
due to the inability of Parliament at the time to enact a supreme-law Bill 
of Rights. Government policy was ineffective to protect and regulate 
rights72 and courts now regulate these rights, their holders—the citizens, 
and infringers—the state.73  
 
[19] Courts are surgical in their rights intervention. Not only does a 'right 
exist' or is a 'right breached' (either by act or omission) but policy 
                                                 
66 See the Interpretations Act 1999, s 5: where "The meaning of an enactment must be ascertained form its 
text and in the light of its purpose" this is a version of the golden rule/thread running through most 
judicial interpretation of statutes. 
67 Lord Cooke of Thorndon "The Basic Terms" (Remarks at the final session of the Supreme Court 
Conference) (2004) 2 NZLPIL 114 at 114.  
68 Patrick Luff "The Political Economy of Court-Based Regulation" (2013) in Ugo Mattei (ed) Research 
Handbook on Political Economy and Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2015) chapter 20 at 13. 
69 See Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 28, for express recognition of the other forgotten pre-existing common law 
rights existing outside of the Act. 
70 Currently the Rt. Hon. Sir Geoffrey Palmer, QC, AO, KCMG, former Minister of Justice, Attorney-
General, Prime Minister, Law Commissioner, and current Distinguished Fellow, Faculty of Law, Victoria 
University of Wellington.  
71  Law Commission Crown Liability and Judicial Immunity (NZLC - Report 37): specifically A response to 
Baigent’s case and Harvey v Derrick - 3 The Bill of Rights Act, Baigent’s case and its implications; Simpson v Attorney-
General (Baigent’s case) [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA). 
72 Patrick Luff "Risk Regulation and Regulatory Litigation" (2011) 64 Rutgers Law Review 73. 
73 Bill of Rights Act, s 3: limits the applicability of the rights to acts done by either of the three branches of 
government or those exercising a public function, power or duty by or pursuant to law.  
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intervention is formulated in the form of remedy awarded. BORA 
remedies are discretionary and do not exist as a right once a breach is 
established. Our courts act by implication with their regulatory policy 
directives; allowing monetary damages, the threat of future damages or a 
declaration speak for itself. The court may not direct legislative conduct, 
although it can declare a breach 74  and notionally penalise it - via a 
declaration (a stern admonition) or Baigents damages. The position is 
deserving of some criticism as the court cannot prohibit, in the form of 
an order (mandamus), the executive or legislative action from occurring 
again, in so far as striking down the offending statute. This is because the 
court has no control over the legislature and the executive is often acting 
pursuant to legislature enablement/Acts of Parliament. Only the threat 
of future judicial condemnation exists to stop the legislature trampling 
rights, or pragmatically in NZ's executive dominated legislature – judicial 
condemnation of the government of the day, which usually holds both 
executive and legislative majority. This may appear 'soft' regulation, but it 
is more forceful when considering that BORA contained no remedy 
provisions whatsoever from the Acts outset. Both Baigents damages and 
declarations are creatures of the courts’ design and implementation 
mechanisms created by the court within the bounds of NZ's 
constitutional arraignment. Parliament, although yet to be tested, is 
ostensibly sovereign.75 
 
[20] The judiciary regulates conduct. When adjudicating fundamental rights, 
their regulatory reach can have aggregate effect on all rights in the 
state/market not just in the lis before the court. "Law structures 
conversations about regulation"76 but also allows for its implementation 
writ large. This mechanism allows an analysis of issues in a way that 
would be "impossible when we dismiss out of hand the entire judicial 
regulatory enterprise as illegitimate judicial activism".77 Courts do more 
than simply adjudicating disputes inter se, and, when they do so, it is not 
necessarily to be dismissed as illegitimate activism.78 That said, concerns 
regarding courts as regulators do not "dispose of the concerns of 
legitimacy and efficacy that attend judicial policymaking". 79  I am 
confident that the ability for the judiciary to regulate in the field of rights, 
                                                 
74 Taylor v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 1706. 
75 As specifically stated in the Supreme Court Act 2003, s 3(2). Although Lord Cooke of Thorndon "The 
Road Ahead for the Common Law" (2004) 53 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 273 at 11, is 
of the view that "the supremacism of either [Court or Parliament] has no place".  
76 Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung "Regulation Above and Beyond the state: Legitimation" in Bronwen 
Morgan and Karen Yeung (ed) An Introduction to Law and Regulation (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2007) 303 at 323, 6.4.1. 
77 Luff "The Political Economy of Court-Based Regulation" above n 68, at 19. 
78 Morgan and Yeung "Regulation Above and Beyond the state: Legitimation" above n 76, at 331, 6.5.2. 
79 Luff "The Political Economy of Court-Based Regulation" above n 68, at 19. 
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and the public's acceptance of this, is part of the legitimate function of 
the common law.80 In NZ this stems perhaps not from BORA in the 
1990s, or primarily from common law principles immemorial,81 but in 
part due appreciation in both the public and legal fields of statements 
from Sir Robin Cooke,82 a judicial talisman in NZ rights discourse who 
has left his mark on many a constitutional norm. Sir Robin is not the 
jurisdictional authority whom NZ courts rely on to allow them to 
regulate rights but he is a guiding influence in this area and provides 
judicial direction to his brethren as to how far the NZ bench could go in 
the field of rights regulation – stemming from the common law – and 
now BORA.  
 
F All that being said and done, what then is Regulation? 
[21] Presenting most difficulty is classifying 'regulation' within a legal 
system.83 Even Morgan and Yeung admit that from a legal perspective 
regulation is "notoriously difficult to define with clarity and precision".84 
At one end, regulation is not entirely black letter law; at the other end it 
is discernable that the Takeovers Code 85  is regulation. The widest 
perspective is that all common law is a form of regulation, especially 
when common law is used as or effects social control/order and has 
coercive power. 86  But not all air is breathable, and not all law is 
regulation or regulatory in nature. The exact formula is a paradigm I may 
not successfully resolve, and nor do I suggest that an attempt to define 
and demarcate 'regulatory law' is a fruitful exercise. I focus on 'Rights 
law'87 as inherently upheld and protected by the courts as a discrete form 
of judicial common law regulation.  
 
                                                 
80 S. Breyer "Regulation and its reform: Changes in Liability Rules" (1982) in Bronwen Morgan and Karen 
Yeung (ed) An Introduction to Law and Regulation (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007) 106 at 90: 
Breyer describes this in regulatory terminology as the non-economic or moral factors in the common law 
in the context of the difficulty of always achieving an efficient economic ends in liability rules.  
81 Developing from the Norman conquests or perhaps since recorded in the volumes of the Selden Society. 
82 Robin Cooke, Baron Cooke of Thorndon. New Zealand's only judge to have ever sat in the House of 
Lords and one of this countries most influential jurists. 
83 Ogus "Comparing regulatory systems: Institutions, processes and legal forms in industrialised countries" 
above n 24, at 138. 
84 Morgan and Yeung "Introduction" (A legal perspective on regulation) above n 35, at 3 
85 Takeovers Act 1993, s 28 (3); The Takeover Code issued pursuant to the Takeovers Code Approval 
Order 2000 (SR 2000/210). Available at wwwtakeovers.govt.nz. 
86 Morgan and Yeung "Introduction" above n 35 at 4. 
87 Rishworth "The Legal Protection of Human Rights in NZ: A Short History and Overview of the 
Contemporary Scene" above n 68, at chapter 3. 
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[22] In terms of a definition of regulation, it is an almost ethereal phrase.88 
Regulation is "a rule prescribed for the management of some matter, or 
for the regulating of conduct; governing precept or direction; a standing 
rule".89 Furthermore although it is not every rule, as defined by Hood et 
al, regulation exists due to its "… capacity for standard-setting, to allow a 
distinction to be made between more or less preferred states of the 
system…there must be some capacity for behavior-modification to 
change the state of the system".90 Rights law and constitutional norms fit 
comfortably within the Hood et al definition. Logically 'what is the 
system?' is addressed in this paper in terms either the courts and judiciary or 
their underlying constitutional function, both adjudicators and rights 
protectors. It is this class which I focus on as an under recognised entity 
which legitimately modifies aggregate behavior via the lis before them.  
 
[23] Courts and the judiciary are unique regulators. When a citizen takes 
action in court against the state to enforce a fundamental right, or a 
tortious or contractual right, the court regulates that right; either in its 
existence, its enforcement, or the degree of its utility to the citizen and 
inconvenience for the state in remedy awarded, financial or otherwise.91 
There will always be one party better off and one party worse off when 
the lis involves any sort of right. This is especially so when the right is 
fundamental because such rights are termed 'core' and 'inalienable' and 
'human' for reasons that they are intrinsic to our very sense of self. In 
this relationship between citizens and state the court sits betwixt 
implementing and designing. The judiciary are not role-playing 'actors' or 
mere functionaries – civil servant bureaucrats – who exist to give effect 
to the system, rather, the judicial mechanism exists because of the right 
to justice.92 It is sui generis with nothing else. Such a right is the regulation 
of conduct between citizen and state, in and of itself, and is informed by 
the constitutional structure. This is why there exists judicial regulators 
with a judicial mechanism as opposed to a 'judicial or arbitrator 
functionary'. It is an important distinction; the latter is to merely 
adjudicate disputes with no recognition of the wider effect of the lis or 
                                                 
88 The easiest way for a black letter lawyer to describe or 'point to' regulation is 'legislative instruments' as 
defined by s 4 Legislation Act 2012. Although to answer for the purposes of this paper that delegated 
legislation are regulations is a very narrow scope indeed; for further discussion see Carter, Carter, 
McHerron and Malone Subordinate Legislation in New Zealand (LexisNexis, Wellington 2013). 
89 The Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009), "regulation".  
90 Christopher Hood, Henry Rothstein & Robert Baldwin The Government of Risk (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2001) at 23. 
91 Such incursion can be into settled substantive law and legal doctrine which may require Government 
departments to alter their policies. Or as the NZ Parliament is supreme, court intrusion may result in 
subsequent corrective legislative action.  
92 The right to justice is both a fundamental common law right, which both underpins the system, exists in 
and is part of our open-textured constitution and is enshrined in statute in s 27 of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990. 
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its contextual constitutional function and is comparable to various small 
claims or limited disputes tribunals who only affect the parties before 
them. In this regulatory thesis the judiciary and courts are part of, and 
can change, the system (norm). On the other hand, a judicial functionary 
or arbitrator cannot change the system and only serves to enforce it in a 
limited sense as even in enforcing the system it is limited in developing it. 
Dispute referee's in tribunals have very limited jurisdiction and do not 
set precedent even amongst other tribunals on the same hierarchy.93  
 
[24] A criticism is that higher rights-based principles are more relevant in 
judicial decision-making and that economic rationality is not the 
prevalent value in legal decision-making.94 Such a view overlooks the 
distinction that there exists a quasi-market for 'rights' also within the 
regulatory sphere due to laws threat and umpire regulatory contributions. 
Law engages with a variety of roles in the regulatory endeavor;95  
At the level of national regulation, both the law's facilitative and 
expressive dimension are reflected in its related but distinct contributions 
to regulation, encapsulated by two images: the law as a threat and the law 
as an umpire. 
A market for rights is not the same as economic rationality. 
Enforcement of, or a lis for, a right may be contrary to the rational act or 
principle.96 This does not preclude that there is both a limited supply of 
rights and unlimited demand for them,97 and that there exists a market. 
While all people inherently possess the same (human/fundamental) 
rights as others, people are not born into substantive equality. A market 
approach to rights realises that recognition of inherent rights is often a 
distributive role of the state which has limited resources. An incorrect 
definition of a 'market' is that there must be a willing buyer and a willing 
seller; that is in fact a theoretical definition of pure laissez-faire 
capitalism. A market is simply a system of exchange.98 Part of the courts’ 
role is inherently distributive in ensuring equilibrium rights distribution 
between citizen and state. Rules against vexatious litigants protect 
                                                 
93 Disputes Tribunal Act 1988, s 10 subject to the Limitation Act 2010; Motor Vehicle Sales Act 2003, s 21. 
94 Hector Fix-Fierro Courts Justice and Efficiency (Hart Publishing, Portland, 2003) at 28. 
95 Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung (ed) An Introduction to Law and Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2007) at 339 ("Chapter 7 Conclusion"). 
96  That individuals maximize their economic utility in every decision they make, they would not for 
example sue someone for the 'principle of the matter'. 
97 The right for refugee seekers to live in New Zealand is current limited to 750 (+- 10%): Department of 
Immigration "New Zealand Refugee Quota" (5 September 2015) 
<www.immigration.govt.nz/migrant/general/generalinformation/media/refugeefactsheet.htm> 
98 Scott "Regulation in the age of governance: The rise of the post-regulatory state" (2004)" in Bronwen 
Morgan and Karen Yeung (ed) An Introduction to Law and Regulation (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2007) 129 at 130; See also Morgan and Yeung "Introduction" (A legal perspective on regulation) above n 
35, at 5. All the authors overcomplicate the system of exchange principle, but their inherent recognition of 
it is clear. 
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citizens and the state against those who may have a claim for a 
right/obligation but who do so for motives which the court considers 
impure.99 The demand for rights increases, for example the right to 'life, 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness', is becoming rarer and is not granted 
easily to non-citizens or those from outside the regulated area.100 The 
role of the judiciary, as a regulatory mechanism and part of the 
foundational norms, then becomes ever more important in modifying 
behavior to change the state of the system.101 
  
                                                 
99 Judicature Act 1908, s 88B; see The Attorney-General v Vincent Ross Siemer [2014] NZHC 859, where Mr. 
Siemer was declared a vexatious litigant after Mr. Siemer took 19 proceedings of which the court found 15 
vexatious. 
100 See in September 2015 the issue of Syrian refugees attempting to cross the Mediterranean for asylum in 
Europe and the differing responses of EU Countries. Prosperous Germany allowing free entry and 
providing 'rights' such as housing, and others such as Hungry building a wall to keep refugees away from 
accessing EU mandated aid: Anne Bernard and Karam Shoumali "Image of Drowned Syrian, Aylan Kurdi, 
3, Brings Migrant Crisis Into Focus" New York Times (4 September 2015) A1. 
101 Hood et al The Government of Risk above n 90, at 23. 
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III Protecting the Suspect Classes – Regulating 
via a lis of  distinction  
 
[25] The reality "of the separation of powers remains problematic in New 
Zealand, with a small unicameral legislature still largely dominated by the 
executive in ways that are even more extreme than executive domination 
of Parliament in the UK".102 It is no accident that "inherent in the act 
[and role] of judging, the role of law may be the result of contextual 
factors"103 and a recognition that "…judges have much scope for agency 
in their decision making" to protect rights.104 The classic criticism of 
judicial regulation is that, "The power of judges to decide important 
questions of public policy seems to run counter to the democratic ideal 
that reserves such decisions to democratically elected representatives"105 
and that such judicial power illegitimately extends beyond adjudicating 
the lis before them into wider constitutional matters.106 This concern is 
built on a foundation of misunderstanding. 
 
[26] From the perspective of a Commonwealth Lawyer107 the powers of the 
Supreme Court of the United States of America ("US SC") seem arcane 
and foreign. That court routinely makes important decisions of public 
policy that would often be left to a democratically elected parliament 
within Commonwealth jurisdictions. 108  The US perception of the 
judiciary is different to their NZ counterparts; primarily as in various 
States of the Union the bench has political appointments and elections. 
However on the Federal Circuit it has a comparable Judicial Oath with 
NZ; to uphold the Constitution and laws (of the United States),109 and 
                                                 
102 Jeremy Waldron "Forward" to Mary-Rose Russell and Matthew Barber (ed) The Supreme Court of New 
Zealand: 2004-2013 (Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2015) vii at viii. 
103 Evans and Fern "From Applications to Appeals: A Political Science Perspective on the New Zealand 
Supreme Court's Dockets" above n 31 at 57. 
104 At 35.  
105 Norman Redlich "Judges as Instruments of Democracy" in Shimon Shetreet (ed) The Role of Courts in 
Society (Kluwer Academic Publishers, The Netherlands, 1988) 149 at 149. 
106 At 149. 
107  Subscribing to the United Kingdom Commonwealth of laws as opposed to the United States 
Commonwealth. 
108 Redlich "Judges as Instruments of Democracy" above n 105, at 149; The recent US SC decision on gay 
marriage Obergefell v Hodges 576 U.S. 14-556 (2015), is prime example. 
109 Judicial Oath 28 U. S. C. § 453: "I, _________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer 
justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully 
and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as _________ under the 
Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God." 
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the US SC is the symbolic tertiary-level classical regulator.110 Evens and 
Fern provide a comparison that;111 
the Supreme Court of Canada is charged with granting leave to cases that 
raise questions of "public importance" and the SCOTUS [Supreme Court 
of the United States] is supposed to grant certiorari… to cases that involve 
"important federal matters… [And] these criteria do not differ greatly 
from those that apply to the Supreme Court in New Zealand 
A recent analysis of the NZ Supreme Court found that in public 
law/rights cases the court was prepared to both cite and use decisions of 
other jurisdictions, the most prevalent being the US.112 
 
[27] The US SC merits comparative analysis as a touchstone with NZ's 
system even though respective perceptions (political versus apolitical) are 
different. Furthermore Evens and Fern conclude that North American 
theories of judicial decision making give the most persuasive account of 
how the NZ Supreme Court selects appeals for review.113 However I 
doubt the allegation of 'governance by the judiciary' could ever be levied 
in NZ. Some may point to the potential for such an occurrence 
stemming from Cooke P's hallowed dicta in Taylor v New Zealand Poultry 
Board 114  but that was by comparison no Roe v. Wade, 115  Marbury v. 
Madison116 or the more recent Obergefell v. Hodges.117 Poultry Board was an 
extrapolation of NZ's judicial reserve power, not an attempt at judicial 
governance. 
                                                 
110 A tertiary-level regulator comparable to the British Commonwealth system; See Herbert Hovenkamp 
"Capitalism: The Supreme Court as Regulator of Business" in Hall, Ely and Grossman (ed) The Oxford 
Companion to the Supreme Court of the United States (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005) 138 at 
138, 146; See also Black "Talking about regulation" above n 16, at 176. 
111 Evans and Fern "From Applications to Appeals: A Political Science Perspective on the New Zealand 
Supreme Court's Dockets" above n 31, at 35. 
112 At twenty-two cases: Waldron "Forward" above n 102, at x. Waldron suspects that "the emergence of 
the Supreme Court a an independent institution has contributed to its willingness to take this stance of 
dialogue and deference to the work of other courts around the world particularly on the issues of rights" at 
xi. 
113 Evans and Fern "From Applications to Appeals: A Political Science Perspective on the New Zealand 
Supreme Court's Dockets" above n 31, at 35, 55; See texts such as Jason L Pierce Inside the Mason Court 
Revolution (Carolina Academic Press, Durham NC, 2006) at 221.  
114 Taylor v New Zealand Poultry Board [1984] 1 NZLR 394. It hardly need repeating for a student educated at 
Victoria University of Wellington that "…some common law rights presumably lie so deep that even 
Parliament could not override them". Cooke's fundamental principles have had somewhat of an impact on 
the Canadian Supreme Court with McLachlin CJ presenting the 2005 Lord Cooke of Thorndon Lecture at 
Victoria University: McLachlin CJ "2005 Lord Cooke of Thorndon Lecture" (2006) 4 NZJPIL 147 at 163, 
concluding that "Ignoring one's judicial conscience is not about staying within one's role, but instead about 
abdicating one's responsibility to the law. There do indeed exist unwritten principals without which the law 
would become contradictory and self-defeating, and it is the duty of judges not only to discover them, but 
also to apply them. To forsake them, in Robert Bolt's phrase, is indeed to take the short route to chaos." 
115 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
116 1 Cranch 137 (1803). 
117 Obergefell v. Hodges above n 108 is the case which declared the ban on gay marriage unconstitutional. 
Obergefell is not a case name yet instantly recognisable, however it likely will be soon. 
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G The Theory of Courts Providing Protection 
[28] Dworkin advanced the theory that the judiciary has the role to further 
morality in the law, this was his "fusion of constitution law and moral 
theory".118 Alexis de Tocqueville's classic political theory concluded that, 
"political questions in American politics are ultimately framed as judicial 
ones".119 If both mould together it appears that the judiciary are either 
the moral visionaries or provide the moral equilibrium of society. I don't 
propose to debate Professors Raz and Waldron on inter-authority 
relationships and which branch should be deferential to whom, in either 
having or exercising morals, or which of courts versus Parliament are 
justified in their respective authority and why. 120  These are valid 
concerns for another paper. It is sufficient to proceed on the premise 
that it is a legitimate function of the courts to regulate so as to protect 
those, who, in the words of Justice Stone in Carolene Products, 121  are 
members of the "suspect classes". It is the courts in most democracies 
who have taken priority in protecting rights and as Shapiro concludes 
citizens often seek out the courts to protect or achieve their own 
"political morality" when the utilitarian nature of democracy goes the 
opposing way.122 
 
[29] Often minority groups are disrespected, marginalised, by the democratic 
process or not afforded fair hearing rights. 123  Many theories are 
seemingly premised on the basis that government and laws represent the 
majority and the judiciary acts in certain cases to overturn the majority 
position for 'moral' reasons, to protect the "suspect classes" and they are 
therefore counter-majoritarian.124 In this vein Justice Kennedy of the US 
SC writing for the majority in the marriage-equality case Obergefell v. 
Hodges held;125 
The dynamic of our constitutional system is that individuals need not 
await legislative action before asserting a fundamental right. The Nation's 
courts are open to injured individuals who come to them to vindicate their 
own direct, personal stake in our basic charter. An individual can invoke a 
                                                 
118 Ronald Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1977) at 149. 
119 Kenneth D Ward "The Politics of Disagreement: Recent Work in Constitutional Theory" (2003) 65 The 
Review of Politics 425 at 425 The author quotes Alexis de Tocqueville a French Revolutionary era political 
theorist who is most well known for his work Democracy in America (1835). 
120 Nicole Roughan Authorities (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013), "The Waldron-Rax Exchange" at 
89. 
121 United Staves v Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 Note 4 (1938) 
122 Martin Shapiro "Who guards the guardians? Judicial control of administration" (1988) in Bronwen 
Morgan and Karen Yeung (ed) An Introduction to Law and Regulation (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2007) 260 at 262. 
123 Redlich "Judges as Instruments of Democracy" above n 105, at 151 discussing Justice Stone's theory. 
124 At 152. 
125 Obergefell v. Hodges above n 108, at 24. 
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right to constitutional protection when he or she is harmed, even if the 
broader public disagrees and even if the legislature refuses to act.  
I query if such forceful sentiment would be issued from the NZ 
Supreme Court 126  even on questions of democracy and fundamental 
rights. Not least because of our fundamentally different 'charters', but 
due to the underlying "dynamic" of our constitutional system. Indeed in 
Quilter v Attorney-General127the Court of Appeal, then our apex domestic 
appeals court, specifically left the matter of the definition of "marriage", 
'man and woman' in the Marriage Act 1956, to Parliament. As Joseph 
explains "This decision checked the potential of s 6 to revisit established 
statutory meanings… the Court would not rewrite the legislation under 
guise of applying the Bill of Rights",128 this was even though the court 
had interpretative scope under BORA to do so. It took until 2013 for 
parliament to extend the definition.129 The NZ constitutional charter is 
unwritten and changing, but no less tangible as NZ has a constitution. 
Whether pointing specifically to BORA, the Electoral Act 1993 or 
something unwritten, individuals in NZ still have a personal stake in the 
norms of our constitution and courts take a position in regulating rights 
and norms. 
 
[30] Asking then of NZ's constitutional dynamic three questions present 
themselves; (i) Do individuals in NZ need to await legislative action 
before asserting a fundamental right - thus is something asserted not a 
'right' nor 'fundamental' in our jurisdiction unless Parliament has 
actioned or breached it? This is the view of Dworkin, and influences 
Kennedy J in Obgerfell; that the evolving nature and development of 
constitutional rights are based on norms of political morality; that 
"…legal practice in Anglo-American political Culture demands the 
integrity of law. Integrity is a moral virtue of the law irrespective of 
outcomes".130 Dworkin's examples revolve around rights that were never 
explicitly stated in the US Constitution nor covered by legislation, such 
as marriage-equality. His thesis, most apparent in Laws Empire, was that 
the US SC had a constitutional mandate through his 'law as political 
morality framework'; concluding that you cannot be discriminated on the 
                                                 
126 Although see Elias CJ's extrajudicial statements in Elias CJ "Sovereignty in the 21st century: Another 
Spin on the Merry-Go-round" (2003) 14 P.L.R. 148; Also see the Court of Appeal decision in Quilter v 
Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 532, (1997) 16 FRNZ 298 (CA) where the court specifically left the matter 
for Parliament. 
127 Quilter above. 
128 Philip Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (4th ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2013) at 
1276, 28.4.6. 
129 Marriage (Definition of Marriage) Amendment Act 2013. The Bill was commonly known as the 'same 
sex marriage bill'; state approved civil unions have been legal between all sexes in New Zealand since the 
Civil Union Act 2004.  
130 Siri Ratnapala Jurisprudence (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009) at 182. 
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basis of sexuality, 131  ultimately reflected in the Obgerfell decision. 
Dworkin's definition of popular morality was "the set of opinions about 
justice and other political and personal virtues that are held as matters of 
conviction by most members of a community".132 This is exemplified in 
his ultimate conclusion that the duty of a citizen to submit to the 
authority of law is a moral duty.133 On this founding it must be for the 
courts to regulate 'law as political morality'.  
 
[31] Applied to the NZ context (ii) is our constitutional model not ostensibly 
of Parliamentary Supremacy? Yes, but with caveats that provide a 'last 
resort' regulatory scope/power for the court. And therefore (iii) is the 
NZ judicial regulation of rights, the mechanism, poorer than the USA? 
The answer is no. I argue that outward displays of power and forceful 
oral sentiments from the bench are the wrong premise for the question – 
it would not be in keeping with NZ norms. Our constitutional dynamic 
differs but the ability of the courts to protect fundamental rights is still a 
fundamental norm. These questions will be explored later with reference 
to NZ's law of privacy where the court looked to the common law to 
give effect to privacy rights, which could be founded in common law, 
but were explicitly excluded from BORA by the legislature.134  
 
[32] Justices Kirby and Cooke 135  have shared differing opinions on this 
matter of parliamentary sovereignty. Neither is fallacious and it may well 
be true that "…the moral significance of the ideal of the rule of law 
provides justification for judges to reject legislative supremacy and 
institute judicial supremacy". 136  It is perhaps less of a matter of 
scholarship than ones own inherent corpus constitution. A third 
dimension is found in a long forgotten foreword by Justice Mahon, who, 
critically commenting on the white paper for NZ's proposed Bill of 
Rights Bill wrote;137  
                                                 
131 At 173 
132 Ronald Dworkin Laws Empire (Harvard University Press and Fontana Press, Cambridge MA, 1986) at 97, 
93. 
133 At 191. 
134 C v Holland [2012] NZHC 2155; Hosking v Runting & Others [2004] NZCA 34. 
135 Justice Michael Kirby "Deep Ling Rights – A Constitutional Conversation Continues" (Paper presented 
to The Robin Cooke Lecture 2004, Wellington, New Zealand, 25 November 2004); See also the earlier 
paper Justice Michael Kirby "Lord Cooke and Fundamental Rights" (Paper presented to the New Zealand 
Legal Research Foundation Conference, Auckland, 4-5 April 1997). 
136 Ekins "Judicial Supremacy and the Rule of Law" above n 9, at 127: Although Ekins holds the opposite 
view. 
137 Jerome B Elkind and Anthony Shaw A Standard for Justice: A Commentary on the Draft Bill of Rights for New 
Zealand (Oxford University Press, USA, 1986) at ix: Mahon J made these comments five years after his 
report into the Erebus disaster, where his Honour alleged an "orchestrated litany of lies" conspiracy and 
two years after the Privy Council dismissed his accusations as unfounded against Air New Zealand airline 
executives; See Royal Commissioner Hon. Mahon J Report of the Royal Commission to inquire into the Crash on 
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As an alternative to the Westminster style, there is another way of 
controlling executive power. Leave it to the judges to consider whether an 
act is unlawful or invalid under a Human Rights Act, as infringing a 
declared human right. The rights of …[various human rights…] are too 
plain to require attention but they may be and have been within my 
memory intruded on and eroded by executive power and by uncontrolled 
parliamentary supremacy… I am in favour of the proposal [for a supreme 
law Bill of Rights]. I know exactly how the judicial system of New Zealand 
works. I know of no judge, neither High Court nor Appellate judge, who 
would knowingly violate his judicial oath by yielding to government 
pressure.  
New Zealanders may rest easy that the as of yet 'in reserve' constraints 
on Parliamentary power are "theoretical" and "extrajudicial"138 although 
this may not always be the case. 
 
[33] Perhaps the advent of MMP and NZ's somewhat "Bridled Power" 139  
would have tempered Mahon J's suspicion, it is doubtful. Minister 
Palmer did not succeed in passing a supreme-law Bill of Rights which 
would allow courts to regulate rights and norms and strike offending 
rights inconsistent legislation down (akin to the US SC), much to Sir 
Geoffrey's lament. 140  The thing asserted, a right, such as 'to life',141  
predates the rights statute and emanates either time immemorial or from 
the common law.142 BORA provides an accepted societal mechanism, a 
legislative/regulatory framework, for settling disputes over those rights, 
i.e. the judiciary by regulating them; by founding their substantive 
existence in documentary text – codified written regulations. In Mahon 
J's view, such rights are best governed and adjudicated by the judiciary 
without a restrictive legislative/regulatory framework and as clear from 
his lived experience are most trampled by executive/legislative power.143 
The Judicial Oath specifies that the judge will serve His/Her Majesty 
"according to law", and "…will do right to all manner of people after the 
laws and usages of New Zealand".144 The law before The Bill of Rights 
                                                                                                                                            
Mount Erebus, Antarctica of a DC10 Aircraft operated by Air New Zealand Limited (Wellington, Government 
printers, 1981) at [377]; and Mahon v Air New Zealand Limited & Ors (New Zealand) 1983 UKPC 29. 
138 See Cooper v Attorney-General [1996] 3 NZLR 480 at 484; Shaw v Commissioner of Inland Revenue [1999] 3 
NZLR 154 at 158 (quoting Cooper). 
139 Geoffrey WR Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 2004); See 
in contrast the earlier work Geoffrey WR Palmer Unbridled power (Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1987). 
140  Geoffrey WR Palmer New Zealand’s constitution in crisis (John McIndoe, Dunedin, 1992) at 60: Sir 
Geoffrey opines of its "...relatively humble status as an ordinary act" but does conclude that even though it 
does not allow courts to strike down Acts it still "changes a great deal". 
141 Bill of Rights Act, s 8. 
142 Immemorial or to ascribe a date; with the invasion of the Normans in 1066AD and refined by the 
Plantagenet's in 1154AD.  
143 Likely referring to one particularly long executive tenure, that of Prime Minister Sir Robert Muldoon 
from 1975 to 1984.  
144 Oaths and Declarations Act 1957, s 18, the Judicial Oath remains substantively the same as in the 
Promissory Oaths Act 1908 s 4 (151).  
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Act, qua rights were common law rights/freedoms, now our law is both 
common law rights and BORA145 - it is the mechanics of enforcement in 
the NZ environment that has changed. The "according to law and 
usages" of NZ provides now that when it comes to courts regulating 
rights it is primarily through the current BORA framework. BORA is 
part of the regulatory framework for rights in NZ, and what rights may 
lie deeper, regarding the common law of NZ, is easy to discern (as not 
even parliament can disturb them) but difficult to action. Fundamental 
rights exist outside the BORA framework146 but is easier for courts to 
adjudicate inside BORA then out, as a regulatory framework exists.147 
Citizens come to court, as Shapiro suggests, in order to use the 
framework, BORA, to affect their personal morality.148 
 
H ILLUSTRATION: Taylor v Attorney-General - Disenfranchising the 
Disenfranchised 
[34] Taylor v Attorney-General 149  was indeed a case of affecting personal 
morality. A group of citizens wished to affect their personal morality and 
assert a personal stake in a constitutional norm – universal suffrage. 
Heath J was faced with the following questions; "…whether Parliament 
has passed legislation to deny serving prisoners the right to vote in a 
manner inconsistent with the Bill of Rights, and not justifiable in a free 
and democratic society. [And]… whether this Court should formally 
declare that to be so."150 The framework in this lis of distinction was 
BORA, and it is through "The use of judicial adjudication within a 
regulatory framework [that] provides scope for private enforcement".151  
 
[35] The Attorney-General found the legislation to be inconsistent with 
BORA and went so far as to state that "The objective of the Bill is not 
rationally linked to the blanket ban on voting. [As] It is questionable that 
every person serving a sentence of imprisonment is necessarily a serious 
                                                 
145 Bill of Rights Act, s 28. 
146 Above. 
147 Hancher and Moran "Organizing regulatory space" above n 43, at 66 
148 Shapiro "Who guards the guardians? Judicial control of administration" above n 122, at 262. 
149 Taylor v Attorney-General above n 74. 
150 At [4]. 
151 K. Yeung "Privatising competition regulation" (1998) in Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung (ed) An 
Introduction to Law and Regulation (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007) 210 at 210: Although 
Yeung is analysing competition law, her regulatory framework methodology is equally applicable BORA. 
Her argument is that there was an absence of private enforcement rights in UK competition law, and 
therefore no framework – as such a framework is needed to enable judicial adjudication in a regulated area.  
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offender". 152  In this instance majority policy trumped trammeled 
minority rights. 
 
[36] Faced with the possibility of making the first court declaration of BORA 
inconsistency in NZ's history,153 Heath J emphasised that for the High 
Court to do so would be a "solemn finding". 154  He referred to the 
framework holding that;155  
…the Court is required to take into account quasi-political considerations, 
to determine whether an inconsistency is "demonstrably justified in a free 
and democratic society".156 That is not the type of analysis in which the 
Courts of this country could legitimately indulge before the Bill of Rights 
came into force. The power to do so was conferred by Parliament, when s 
5 was enacted. 
The courts have long questioned the power to declare statutes 
inconsistent157 and this is an example of the judicial mechanism self-
regulating, as the power to declare is not explicitly provided in BORA, 
but through implied interpretive reference in s 4. Professor Rishworth 
explored such a remedy in 1998 and suggested that "But one thing it [s 
4] does not do is preclude comment and proclamation".158 Rishworth 
concluded and Heath J added emphasis that "…once again there is room 
for judicial choice as to where our Bill of Rights should be located on the spectrum of 
constitutional significance".159 Health J placed it high on the mantel.  
 
[37] Professor Geiringer once believed "the prospects for the development of 
a formal declaratory jurisdiction of this kind in New Zealand are, if 
anything, receding".160 Conversely Waldron predicted the NZ Supreme 
Court "…heading in the direction of something like a UK-style 
                                                 
152 Christopher Finlayson Report of the Attorney-General under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 on the 
Electoral (Disqualification of Convicted Prisoners) Amendment Bill (New Zealand Government, 2010) at [16]–[18]: 
The effect of the ban was that a person who was imprisoned for a short sentence that happened to fall 
during the polling period was disenfranchised. It should be pointed out that the Attorney-General did not 
necessarily himself write the report, all he must do is present it to parliament. Often the job is delegated to 
the Ministry of Justice.  
153 Taylor v Attorney-General above n 74, at [36]. In R v Poumako [2000] 2 NZLR 695 (CA) Thomas J at paras 
[86]-[107] was of the view that "nothing less than a formal declaration will suffice to maintain the 
constitutional integrity of the Bill of Rights". 
154 Taylor, at [30]. 
155 At [43]. 
156 Emphasising s 5 Bill of Rights Act 1990; "subject to section 4, the rights and freedoms contained in this 
Bill of Rights may be subject to only such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society", s 4 reads that no other enactments are affected and thus BORA 
is not supreme-law.  
157 First suggested by F M Brookfield "Constitutional Law" (1992) NZ Recent Law Review 231 at 239. 
158 Paul Rishworth "Reflections on the Bill of Rights after Quilter v Attorney-General" (1998) New Zealand 
Law Review 683 at 693, cited in Taylor v Attorney-General above n 74, at [47]. 
159 Taylor v Attorney-General above n 74, at [47]. 
160  Claudia Geiringer "On a Road to Nowhere: Implied Declarations of Inconsistency and the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act" (2009) 40 VUWLR 613, summary of article. 
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Declaration of Incompatibility",161 he was only a few months off and 
tellingly rights declarations are not limited to our apex, Supreme Court, 
but those lower down. Taylor adds to a linage of courts self-regulating 
their power, by extending rights protecting scope. In Baigent's Case the 
view of the court, on finding that damages could be awarded as a remedy, 
or indeed that there were in fact remedies available, for a breach of 
BORA was summarised by Casey J. He noted that it would be odd if, in 
implementing BORA, Parliament intended citizens to fly to the UN for 
redress but not attend NZ courts.162 The judicial mechanism developed 
within the framework (BORA) to provide for "Ubi jus ibi remedium, where 
there is a right there is a remedy, [which] has a long history," in NZ.163 
 
[38] Heath J explicitly regulated outside of the lis in Taylor, and added 
definition to the relationship between citizen and state and the regulatory 
role of the court. Holding that "there is a need for a Court to fashion 
public law remedies to respond to the wrong inherent in any breach of a 
fundamental right".164 It was, according to his Honour's interpretation, 
the "clear" intention of Parliament for the courts to engage "in this type 
of quasi-political analysis required by that section".165 Heath J, via Taylor, 
expanded the courts regulatory reach and like Mahon J before him, 
recognising the solemnity of the occasion, performed his judicial 
function "without fear or favour".166 This is a strong statement from a 
NZ judge. The case concluded with a declaration of inconsistency 
ordered 167  and the reasoning that if a declaration (a discretionary 
remedy) was not made, then "it is difficult to conceive of one when it 
would be".168 The market for a remedy once thought 'receding' is now 
on the rise.169  
                                                 
161 Waldron "Forward" above n 102, at viii. 
162 Baigent's case above n 71, at 701. 
163 Baigent's case as above at 717 referencing Ashby v White (1703) 2 Ld Raym 938 at 953-954 per Holt CJ "If 
the plaintiff has a right, he must of necessity have a means to vindicate and maintain it". 
164 Taylor v Attorney-General above n 74, at [61]: His Honour noted that this would not be any different if the 
breach was committed by the legislative branch of government as opposed to the executive. 
165 At [61]. 
166 At [61] per Heath J: "I do accept that the Court should be fearful about making a formal declaration of 
inconsistency because of the possibility that such an order might be "ignored with disdain or impunity". 
There are two answers to that point. The first is that the judicial oath requires me to do right "without fear 
or favour". The second is that I am not making a political statement in an endeavor to persuade Parliament 
to change its mind. My function is firmly grounded in the obligation of the Court to declare the true legal 
position. Any political consequences of my decision can be debated in the court of public opinion, or in 
Parliament." 
167 At [79]. 
168 At [77a]. 
169 Professor Andrew Geddis analysed the judgment in his blog post on Pundit: Professor Andrew Geddis 
"Bliss that it was dawn to be alive" Pundit (24 July 2015) <www.pundit.co.nz/content/bliss-was-it-in-that-
dawn-to-be-alive>; He also made similar comments to the Justice and Electoral Select Committee after 
Taylor and in the mainstream media See Andrew Geddis "Message on prisoner voting rights ‘unequivocal’" 
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I But a Poor Mans Remedy? 
[39] And yet one may wonder what is the point, pragmatically, of a 
declaration of inconsistency, what function does it serve; does the 
declaration serve any rational or practical purpose? Bar the catharsis of 
airing grievances in public, what do stern words from the bench have, 
bar the practicalities that costs are likely to be awarded against the 
Crown.170 Will the public petition their MPs to remedy the pro tanto 
rights inconstant law? I suggest not; Arthur Taylor is a member of a very 
suspect class – over 150 convictions and a sentence end-date in 2022 is 
unlikely to merit majority sympathy. 171  Is a declaration without a 
consummate order a poor man's succor for a real remedy?  
 
[40] I contrast, from a regulatory perspective, the constitutional premise in 
Taylor (NZ) with the active protection premise in Obergefell (US) as stated 
by Justice Kennedy; "An individual can invoke a right to constitutional protection 
when he or she is harmed, even if the broader public disagrees and even if the 
legislature refuses to act."172 If the underlying constitutional protection as 
enshrined in BORA,173 and the courts can do little but declare that right 
breached when a minority, prisoners, especially those who are non-
violent and incarcerated for a period which happens to fall on polling 
day, then do New Zealanders have a right to constitutional protection? 
Clearly yes, as will be discussed, as it fell to Heath J to regulate the extent 
of protection. On still may ask is how NZ regulates its fundamental 
rights in this instance a regulatory failure? 174  In terms of the court 
issuing mandamus, a remedy available in the USA, whilst rights have 
been breached this is not a tool normally within the NZ judicial armory. 
There is nothing stopping the legislature continuing to breach the right, 
indeed the legislature repealing the infringing Act is unlikely – it is a 
Westminster style government policy. 175  The courts foundational 
mechanism lies in regulating that breach. 
 
[41] Taken to the extreme should Parliament pass a capital punishment 
amendment to the Crimes Act, 176 or as Cooke theorised require the 
courts to receive in evidence "…any statement appearing to be a 
                                                                                                                                            
New Zealand Herald (28 July 2015) 
<http://www.nzherald.co.nz/opinion/news/article.cfm?c_id=466&objectid=11488139>. 
170 Taylor v Attorney-General above n 74, at [80]. 
171 Kirsty Johnston "Career crim Arthur Taylor confident of Parole" Stuff.co.nz (4 September 2013).  
172 Obergefell v. Hodges above n 108, at 24. 
173 Section 12, universal suffrage.  
174 Gunther Teubner "Dilemmas of law in the welfare state" (1986) in Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung 
(ed) An Introduction to Law and Regulation (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007) 70, at 72. 
175 One of the most important features of a Westminster style Government is Executive majority in the 
legislature. 
176 By reenacting ss 14-16 of the Crimes Act 1993. 
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confession of a crime, whether or not obtained by force or any other 
from of compulsion"177 is the only 'remedy' available a) Baigent's damages 
(unhelpful to the dammed) and or b) a declaration of inconsistency.178 
Or would common law rights lie so deep? 179  Significant in the NZ 
democratic dialogue is that the courts, by declaring an inconsistency are 
sending a signal to the public/legislature/executive. Valid criticism is 
that three years is a long time between rights breach and elections,180 and 
this presumes that the democratic majority is prepared to protect the 
rights of the 49%. The Governor-General, through the reserve power 
safeguard is unlikely to refuse assent to a fundamental-rights infringing 
Bill.181 The courts are the last bastion to Government or majority rule 
rights infringement and as such, rights protector of the minority - of 
which have no less value in their rights being infringed than the majority. 
Judicial regulation of rights is fundamental constitutional protection, and 
part of the regulatory mechanism.  
 
[42] So can courts regulate the breach? Inherent in NZ's judicial mechanism 
is that regardless of its efficacy or success in each instance, a declaration 
in Taylor will not allow Mr. Taylor to vote. Courts can choose their 
battles when seeking overall/aggregate rights equilibrium. Reintroducing 
capital punishment might be an infringement which the courts would be 
prepared to question Parliament's ostensible sovereignty and go further 
than a declaration, prisoner disenfranchisement was not. 182  I suggest 
there are reserve powers in the judicial armory and it is a matter of public 
perception of the remedy awarded whether it is successful judicial 
regulation, but it is regulation nonetheless. 
 
                                                 
177 Robin Cooke "Fundamentals" (1988) NZLJ 158 at 164: The other fundamental breach examples were 
stripping Jews of their citizenship and disenfranchising women (or men). 
178 Interpretation can also be a remedy; such as reading down the offending statute so that it is rights 
compliant. However this example is based on the premise that Parliament has drafted the statue in the 
strongest and clearest terms so that interpretation as rights consistent would not be possible; See Janet L. 
Hiebert "New Constitutional Ideas: Can new Parliamentary Models Resist Judicial Dominance When 
Interpreting Rights?" (2003-2004) 82 Tex L Rev 1963; J McLean "Legislative invalidation, human rights 
protection and s 4 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act" (2001) NZL Rev 421 at 429-430. 
179 As suggested by Cooke P in Taylor v New Zealand Poultry Board above n 114. 
180 Electoral Act 1993, s 17: The three year term provision is entrenched by s 268 and can only be amended 
by a 75% majority in the House of Representatives, although s 268 itself is not double entrenched. 
181 Governor-General Sir Anand Satyanand "Speech to launch Dame Catherine Tizard's memoirs" (Speech 
at Government House Auckland, 16 September 2010) available at ,https://gg.govt.nz/content/cat-
amongst-pigeons-book-launch.: Sir Anand reminded that audience of a "particular piece of legislation [that] 
did not appeal to Dame Cath at all. She asked the question of her responsible official and asked the 
question of herself and finally said (apparently). "All right, I will sign my assent, but I will do it in black ink!" A 
special bottle was obtained and used for the purpose!"; See also Gavin McLean The Governors: New Zealand's 
Governors and Governors-General (Otago University Press, Otago, 2006).  
182 Cooke "Fundamentals" above n 177, at 163. 
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On the question of fundamental regulation of citizen rights qua the state 
Cooke asked of this "question of perennial fascination" - "is it at bottom 
only interpretation [in relation to Acts of Parliament] or is there 
something more?"183 His ultimate conclusion and concern was that there 
was something more, and this is in part what I ascribe as unique to 
judicial regulation. Sir Robin concluded that "The Judge's work is part of 
the pathology of society. With luck one can go through a judicial career 
without having to confront the really big choices about constitutional 
power". 184 He found it "ultimately an inescapable judicial 
responsibility",185 not as "an incitement to judicial activism",186 but to 
identify the fundamental rights and to protect them. This power within 
the judicial mechanism lies in reserve, the ability to, in only rare instances 
limit legislative power.187 This is at the core of the judicial regulatory 
mechanism in NZ – that there is something more to 'it' than other 
regulatory mechanisms. The judicial mechanism is entwined with the 
responsibility to protect constitutional and fundamental rights even at 
the expense of other norms such as legislative power. It can question its 
demarcated area. This is a responsibility to be used only on rare 
occasions and is distinct from all other regulators which may not step 
outside or question their regulatory area demarcations. Should the 
Commerce Commission attempt to regulate charities it would suffer 
from a Judicial Review challenge on the grounds of ultra vires.  
 
[43] There is uniqueness in the NZ judicial-regulatory dynamic when 
contrasted with the US. As Taylor exemplifies vindication of the personal 
stake in the charter – occasionally breached – may be just as important 
as substantive remedy for the breach. For should mandamus be always 
available within the BORA framework (as opposed to being held in 
reserve for breaches of deep ling rights) than a fundamental norm of our 
system would have been dramatically altered; that is parliament is 
sovereign in all but some reserve instances. Individuals in NZ need not 
await legislative action before asserting a fundamental right but there are 
differing classes of rights which can be breached. I suggest entwined in 
the judicial regulatory mechanism is an element of pragmatism. The 
various theories underlying the provision of protection to the infringed 
or "suspect classes" all subscribe to the view that what is infringed, is 
from a majoritarian perspective, framed as a 'political' question as 
opposed to a constitutional question, and this is further explored in the 
next section. The regulator must act politically and pragmatically whilst 
                                                 
183 At 159. 
184 At 159. 
185 At 165. 
186 At 164. 
187 At 164. 
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still apportioning law and 'rights' in the market – a declaration of 
inconsistency as awarded in Taylor was the right balance.  
J Waldron's Process Based Approach Renewed to Judicial Regulation  
[44] Waldron's Process Theory argues that political institutions are faced with 
"circumstances of integrity"188 as within diverse democracies passionate 
moral sentiments will differ. 189 Rawls and Hume identified moderate 
scarcity and limited altruism as the circumstances of justice, 190 when 
people invariably disagree about moral sentiments (for example 
euthanasia)191 then procedures and frameworks must be developed to 
address the conflicts arising from those conditions and "in a manner that 
respect the fact of disagreement".192 The fundamental rights procedure 
and framework for disagreements between government and citizen, in 
NZ, is judicial regulation by the court, within the confines of BORA and 
reserve remedies. It is important that judges are not instruments of 
popular will and are, when required converse to democracy: their BORA 
verdicts often anti majoritarian policy. Thus, the fact that NZ judges 
exist in their positions 'un-democratic' and their adjudication can be anti-
democratic is a vital feature of democracy itself. Parliament does not 
solely own "the democratic mantel".193 The judiciary is the regulator for 
social justice and 'circumstances of integrity' en mass when a lis of 
constitutional/rights distinction presents itself.  
 
[45] The judiciary can act both as a counter-weight to the abuses of 
government, executive branch and also to the inherent majority swing of 
democracy and "all are partners in the common endeavor of 
representative government."194 There are successive popular instances 
where the judiciary acts as the enforcer of the democratic will when it 
perceives the interpretation of rights is not reflected in the policy of the 
Government. An extrajudicial comment from Justice Blackmun who 
wrote leading judgment in Roe v. Wade195 expressed personal concern, 
and that of some of his brethren of pandering to perceived citizen 
majority influence;196  
                                                 
188 Jeremy Waldron Law and Disagreement (Clarendon Press, London, 1999) at 191. 
189 At 207. 
190 At 198. See Hume A Treatise of Human Nature (1738) Book III, Part II, s. ii at 495–496. See also John 
Rawls A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 2005). 
191 See Seales v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 1239. 
192 Ward "The Politics of Disagreement: Recent Work in Constitutional Theory", above n 119, at 431. 
Redlich "Judges as Instruments of Democracy", above n 105, at 152. 
194 At 156. 
195 Roe v Wade, above n 115. 
196 Justice Harry A. Blackmun "Justice and Society" in Shimon Shetreet (ed) The Role of Courts in Society 
(Kluwer Academic Publishers, The Netherlands, 1988) 439 at 442: You only need look at images of 
protestors standing outside the US SC waving flags, chanting and waiving banners when the Court debated 
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How powerful – at least in my country – is the bench… I am struck 
indeed with the "awefullness" of that power…[the judiciary should] 
refrain from excessive use of that power and yet – yes – utilize it when it is 
necessary so to do …[there can be an] exercise of raw Judicial power. 
His colleague on the bench, Justice White remarked, "The system works, 
but why?"197 That the NZ judiciary lacks the "awefullness" of that power 
is both cause for celebration and concern, especially should, if in 
instances of reserve, they need to exercise power and find it difficult. 
The underlying sentiment from Justice Blackmuns' erstwhile need to 
pick the mood of the public and self-censor the "raw Judicial power", are 
manifestly overt political considerations, or in judicial parlance 'policy 
considerations'. The NZ judiciary does not grapple with such 
considerations the same degree because they lack the same outward 
power, although of necessity they may hold it on reserve.  
 
[46] Courts are often portrayed as "passive" in so far as they are "institutions" 
which can set their agendas "in only the most limited sense" as they 
respond to "actual controversies brought before them by real litigants", 
the lis.198 This is incorrect in relation to courts in general,199 and to the 
NZ Supreme Court specifically. It has an institutional role it has self-
constructed very similar to the agenda setting of the North American 
Courts, US SC and the Canadian Supreme Court.200 The NZ Supreme 
Court exercises discretionary jurisdiction choosing cases and shaping the 
law via lis' of distinction – regulating outside the lis to affect 
constitutional change en mass.201  
 
[47] West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 202  is a notable US SC 
decision and an example of a courts institutional role. The majority held 
that the freedom of speech clause in the Constitution granted protection 
from mandatory swearing-saluting allegiance to the flag. 203  Justice 
                                                                                                                                            
gay marriage in Obergufell v Hodges to understand the potential for citizen influence, although from a 
particular segment of mobile society. Similar images are not unheard of, but not normally seen outside the 
New Zealand Supreme Court on Lambton Quay, Wellington.  
197 At 443. 
198 HW Perry Deciding to Decide: Agenda-Setting in the United States Supreme Court (Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA, 1991) at 11; Dame Sian Elias (Chief Justice of New Zealand) "Speech at the Special 
Sitting of the New Zealand Supreme Court" (Supreme Court of New Zealand, Wellington, 1 July 2004). 
199 Evans and Fern "From Applications to Appeals: A Political Science Perspective on the New Zealand 
Supreme Court's Dockets" above n 31, at 55. 
200 At 55. 
201 There is no right of appeal to the Supreme Court, applicants must seek leave and the court picks cases 
in the public interest or of general importance in developing the law: Supreme Court Act 2003, s 13(1),(2). 
Lower courts can also exercise this institutional function by adjudicating many cases and picking particular 
judgments by which to shape the law. 
202 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
203 The case is notable because it highlights the supremacy of the First Amendment right, even with regards 
something considered so very American and patriotic at a time when the country was at war. 
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Fankfurter in his minority dissent articulated a view not often seen in 
court arbitrating constitutional decisions;204 
The tendency of focusing attention on constitutionality is to make 
constitutionality synonymous with wisdom, to regard a law as all right if it 
is constitutional. Such an attitude is a great enemy…. 
In his opinion there was something greater at stake than the fundamental 
rights of freedom of speech and expression provided for in the 
Constitution. Ergo the US's underlying fundamental charter may not 
always align with typical judicial concerns such as fairness, equity, justice 
and wisdom and there may be at times a justifiable imbalance205 between 
state and citizen rights. 
 
[48] Frankfurter J's Barnette dissent is most notable for explicit reference to 
his Judaic background as a way of preempting public criticism for not 
deciding along his presumed personal bias in supporting First 
Amendment rights. The group who refused to swear allegiance to the 
flag where religious minorities objecting on expression and religious 
grounds;206  
But [as if to preempt criticism] as judges we are neither Jew nor Gentile, 
neither Catholic nor agnostic…As a member of this Court I am not 
justified in writing my private notions of policy into the Constitution…. It 
can never be emphasized too much that one's own opinions about the 
wisdom or evil of law should be excluded altogether when one is doing 
one's duty on the bench. 
It is an explanation of which J.A.G Griffith would be skeptical,207 but 
one exemplified in and reminiscent of both Heath and Mahon JJ's 
references to their judicial oaths.  
 
K ILLUSTRATION: Valerie Morse and Free Expression 
[49] The NZ Supreme Court regulated a comparable lis to Barnette providing 
a similar exemplification of its institutional role. Yet it regulated in a 
decidedly different way in Valerie Morse v The Police208 thus highlighting 
our unique, almost indirect, but no less successful, regulatory mechanism. 
Ms. Morse burned the NZ flag on the grounds of the Victoria University 
of Wellington Law School in full view of the Cenotaph and Anzac day 
dawn war-memorial service.209 She argued that her act was an expression 
of opinion protected by the freedom of expression clause in BORA,210 
                                                 
204 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette above n 202, at 646 – 647. 
205 As opposed to a market equilibrium, or indeed a new equilibrium as the case may be. 
206 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette above n 202, at 670 – 671. 
207 John Aneurin Grey Griffith The Politics of the Judiciary (1st ed, FontanaCollins, London, 1977). 
208 Valerie Morse v The Police above n 28. 
209 At [1]. 
210 At [1], per Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 14: "Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the 
freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form." 
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and was convicted in the District Court of 'offensive and disorderly 
behavior'.211 Her appeals to the High Court and Court of Appeal were 
dismissed. 212 The Chief Justice chose to grant the appeal finding the 
charge and subsequent convictions based on "an erroneous 
understanding of what constitutes offensive behavior". 213  Tipping J 
referred to BORA only in passing.214 He found that "…those affected 
are required, for the purpose of the necessary assessment, to be 
appropriately tolerant of the rights of others" but that whether the 
defendants conduct was offensive "in law" was a "contextual 
decision".215 Only McGrath J found the behavior clearly offensive in 
terms of the charge, but "expressive conduct, which is protected by the 
right to freedom of expression".216 He considered whether the limitation 
was justified per s 5 BORA and found that the charge was not 
warranted. 217  Dr. Farmer, QC, who often appears before the Court, 
concludes that "The Supreme Court's judgment in Morse must raise real 
questions of the ability of appellate judges who are far removed from the 
day-to-day world of ordinary New Zealanders to interpret and apply 
statutes that are said to embody New Zealand values" as "Anzac Day is 
part of the fabric of this Nation".218 
 
[50] This was not a judgment, similar to that as expressed by the Court of 
Appeal219 - 'Bill of Rights Freedom of Expression versus Disorderly Conduct Flag 
Burning' - but of contextual analysis of the charge "objectively 
assessed". 220  The result from a constitutional/rights perspective, 
however, was that Ms. Morse had the charges against her dismissed. 
"There is a view that the Supreme Court should focus on the great social 
issues of the day",221 and the Court must have viewed Morse as such as it 
was only one of two criminal cases between 2004 and 2013 which 
resulted in judgments from each member of the bench.222 The citizen-
majority do not always appreciate the protection of rights and the 
                                                 
211 Summary Offences Act 1981, s 4(1)(a). 
212 Valerie Morse v The Police above n 28, at [2]. Technically Elias CJ found that the lower courts had made an 
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215 At [72]. 
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218 Jim Farmer "A Barrister's Perspective" in Mary-Rose Russell and Matthew Barber (ed) The Supreme Court 
of New Zealand: 2004-2013 (Thomson Reuters, Wellington, 2015) 61 at 88. 
219 The Queen v Valerie Morse [2009] NZCA 623. 
220 Valerie Morse v Police above n 28, at [7] per Elias CJ; Above n 219.. 
221 Farmer "A Barrister's Perspective" above n 218 at 83. 
222 Prasad, Biggs and Robertson "Criminal Law" above n 122, at 348. 
  37 
judgment has been described as "caustic" 223  for allowing the Morse 
expression. Reminiscent of Frankfurter J's Barnette dissent, Thomas J, a 
retired member of the Supreme Court bench, writing extra judicially 
under judicial alias as High Court Justice Athena J 224  said it was a 
case;225  
…in which an impoverished amoral concept of "public order" is judicially 
ordained; a law in which the right to freedom of expression trumps – or 
tramples upon – other rights… to which individuals and minorities may 
be exposed to uncivil, and even odious, ethic, sexist, homophobic, anti-
Christian, anti-Semitic, and anti-Islamic taunts providing no public 
disorder results… a law which demeans dignity… a law in which the 
mores or standards of society are set without regard to the reasonable 
expectations of citizens in a free and democratic society… [T]hat is 
beyond the pale in a civil and civilized society. 
Evans and Fern, perhaps in defense of the Supreme Court's conscious 
decision not to adjudicate Morse on rights grounds as one of the great 
social issues of the day argue that the Court is in its "capital building 
years, and, "in futures, it is conceivable that political conflict…and the 
institutionalisation of judicial power may combine in ways that make for 
a more assertive Supreme Court".226 NZ and UK courts do not typically 
display the linguistic candor of Athena J227 even though her Honour 
came down on the opposing side of the rights divide. Perhaps one-day 
dissents of the ilk of Frankfurter and Athena/Thomas J, or rights 
asserting decisions as in Obergefull or the majority in Barnette who 
protected freedom of speech/expression would issued from the bench 
once the NZ court becomes more assertive.  
 
[51] The Morse decision was popularized as "Ruling makes flag burning legal, 
says expert". The expert, Bill Hodge of Auckland University was quoted 
as saying "You can now burn the New Zealand flag any time, anywhere 
you like".228 With respect, that would be the case if the court had held 
that the protection of freedom of expression229 reigned supreme, as the 
US SC did in Barnette, but it did not. The Court held that the "case was 
distorted by failure to identify the meaning of the provision [of the 
                                                 
223 Farmer "A Barrister's Perspective" above n 218 at 87. 
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Summary Offences Act] in issue" and it was not "…confident on the 
evidence that a conviction could properly have been entered [as the 
behavior was not] assessed as objectively disorderly".230 In no way has 
flag burning made legal, on the contrary as long as it is objectively 
disorderly or provocative (for example had Ms. Morse been situated on 
the Cenotaph not across the road at the Law School) it is still illegal in 
black-letter law.231 However the regulatory effect, sotto voce,232 is that the 
Police (as a branch of the executive) will now no longer charge a citizen 
with an offence for burning the flag, and the pragmatic results of Barnette 
contrasted with Valerie Morse are the same. Both courts issued clear 
directions to the executive branches, but with different regulatory 
dialogue.  
 
L Privacy Rights and Regulation outside BORA 
[52] The judiciary also regulates rights in lis' Citizen v Citizen, which have writ 
large aggregate affect on society as a whole. Courts no longer 'find and 
declare the law' and there is wide recognition of the judicial function of 
law making,233 the common law is not a library yet to be catalogued by 
the judiciary. With that comes recognition that the judicial decision is 
therefore dependent on both the inclination of the judge and the 
traditions of the society. Due to the system of precedent the outcomes 
of disputes are shaped by previous disputes, and thus the role of the 
court in the society is influenced by the nature of previous disputes, stare 
decisis, brought before them. 234  An expansion of the judicial role in 
society, especially with regards disputes of rights and public policy, plays 
an important regulatory function and therefore the judiciary's role cannot 
be underestimated.  
 
[53] Sir Geoffrey Palmer, himself as Attorney-General recommending over 
forty-eight judicial appointments, stated;235  
It is clear that as the chief expositors, applicators and significant 
developers of the laws, the Judges must be regarded as important. They 
are important because the law is important…they make the legal rules in a 
not inconsiderable number of instances which will be applied to future 
conduct. 
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I go further than Sir Geoffrey, the judiciary as a class often make the 
legal rules, either primary or secondary,236 they interpret them and they 
apply them to the fact patterns before them and give directions either via 
precedent or obiter for future applicability. They can create tests or 
develop new areas of law to further regulate conduct. This is evidenced 
in the area of privacy law, firstly by Hosking v Runting237 where the Court 
of Appeal accepted that there was a common law tort of privacy in NZ. 
No tort existed before, and the court created the two-part test of the 
reasonable expectation of privacy and the publicity of facts highly 
objectionable to the reasonable person.238 The Courts overall regulation 
of social conduct was subject to the defense of legitimate public 
concern/interest emanating from the right of freedom of expression.239 
Subsequently Whata J in the High Court faced with a similar yet distinct 
situation where there was no publicity of objectionable content held that 
the NZ common law should recognise a tort of intrusion into seclusion 
and created both the tort and test for it. 240  Before Hosking or C v 
Holland241 NZ law did not know of ether civil actions nor had suitable 
remedies available to victims/plaintiffs harmed. The legal answers, 
substantive rights for wrongs committed, were judicial creations, wholly 
legitimate responses to social conduct unbecoming in NZ society. 
Creatures of common law permitted and informed by the NZ 
constitution, in so far as such creatures could be created and the creature, 
privacy, was recognised as a right. Therefore what matters is, in doing so, 
by not just effecting remedies (as it the accepted norm) but by creating 
rights, is where do judicial officers see themselves within the 
constitutional framework? An answer postulated by J.A.G Griffith is 
that;242  
It is the creative function of judges that makes their job important and 
makes worthwhile some assessment of the way they behave, especially in 
political cases. It must be remembered that in most cases for most of the 
time the function of the judge…is to ascertain the facts. But when 
question of law do arise, their determination may be of the greatest 
importance because of the effect that will have on subsequent cases… 
 
[54] Should C v Holland not have appeared on Whata J's civil list that day then 
the regulation of our social conduct may be very different – in that 
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242 Griffith The Politics of the Judiciary above n 207, at 17. 
  40 
specific sphere it may still be unregulated. For if the Judge who heard the 
case had not seen it as his judicial function to regulate good social 
morays and conduct in an area where parliament would not 243  then 
neither the tort would exist but a wrong244 would go forth without a 
remedy: an important declaration that admonishing said conduct would 
be missed. Moreover the 'manner' that the judiciary respects and 
responds to civil/social disagreement, as Waldron identifies, the process 
theory, is an equally important judicial function,245 as indeed is judicial 
regulation of society and social conduct between citizens. The judicial 
regulatory mechanism is not just limited to constitutional matters and 
rights adjudication between citizen and state but extends into the 
commercial sphere. 
 
  
                                                 
243 By creating a civil regime for breach of privacy, this did not occur in part until the Harmful Digital 
Communications Act 2015. 
244 The 'wrong' in C v Holland as explained in the judgment was that Mr. Holland had hidden a camera in 
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laptop. 
245 Waldron "Forward" above n 102, at vii; Waldron Law and Disagreement above n 188, at 191. 
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IV Illustration: The Early Political Judge 
through Commerce  
 
Every practicing barrister knows before which judges he would prefer not 
to appear in a political case…This however is to say little more than that, 
as we have already remarked, judges are human with human prejudices. 
And that some are more human than others…But if that were all we 
would expect to find a wide spectrum of judicial opinion about political 
cases. Instead, we find a remarkable consistency of approach in these 
cases concentrated in a fairly narrow part of the spectrum of political 
opinion. It spreads from that part of the center which is shared by right-
wing Labour, Liberal and 'progressive' Conservative opinion.246 
J.A.G Griffith The Politics of the Judiciary (1977) 
 
 
[55] In this example the Judiciary are vested with wide scope to act as 
Parliament's political regulators. They regulate specifically in a 
commercial private rights arena, having an effect wider than the singular 
lis in the particular inter se dispute. They are rights regulators in a non-
constitutional lis. 
 
[56] In 1956, the Restrictive Practices Court was established in the UK.247 Its 
function was an early precursor to anti-competitive practices tribunals 
and it was to provide "…for the registration and judicial investigation of 
certain restrictive trading agreements, and for the prohibition of such 
agreements when found contrary to the public interest"248. Comprising 
of a mixed bench of High Court judiciary and lay businessmen, it's scope 
was much wider than later competition regulation under NZ's Part 2 of 
the Commerce Act 1986, and indeed is its current UK iteration. The 
court could void restrictive competitive agreements between 
businessmen on the criterion that "…a restriction is deemed to be 
contrary to the public interest unless the court is satisfied that it is 
reasonably necessary or that its removal would be more harmful to the 
public than its retention."249  
 
[57] Griffith identifies a decidedly 'political' case in the courts tenure, in Re 
Yarn Spinners Agreement,250 only the second case ever heard by this court 
and one of its most political. Precursors to the Act contained no 
                                                 
246 Griffith The Politics of the Judiciary above n 207, at 31. 
247 Restrictive Practices Act 1956 (UK). 
248 Preamble. 
249 Griffith The Politics of the Judiciary above n 207, at 40. 
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concrete definition of what was or was not in the public interest251 and 
yet this nebulous void was of little concern to the House of Commons. 
In the Commons many of the debates focused on the establishment of 
the "special court of law" to adjudicate on the validity of restrictive 
agreements i.e. were they within the public interest and thus 
permissible. 252  The Conservative Government found it desirable that 
decisions concerning public interests aspects of trade were left to the 
judiciary, whereas the Labour opposition contended that such issues 
were non-justiciable and ought to be decided by the Minister (which 
ironically would have been a Tory Minister).253 A compromise was made 
and the preamble to the Act provides vesting a special court with 
investigatory powers comprising a mixed bench of judges and laymen.254  
 
[58] Every practice that came before the court labored under a rebuttable 
presumption that it was contrary to the public interest. Section 20(1) 
provided the declaratory power of the court to hold any restriction 
(business agreement) as "…contrary to the public interest" and further 
void those restrictions. 255  Whist the Act listed several circumstances 
availing the business to argue that their practices were in the public 
interest, the court's wide discretion could outweigh any potential 
justification due to two specific clauses. Firstly, the restriction must not 
be unreasonable and must be balanced against the detriment it inflicted 
on the public at large (not the benefit to the business or the industry) or 
third parties to the agreement.256 Secondly existed the "famous tailpiece" 
of the legislation, s 21.257  
 
[59] Once the businessman has argued that his practice comes within one of 
the seven availing circumstances258 the tailpiece of the legislation comes 
into operation. For the court to find in favor of the business it must be 
"…satisfied…that the restriction is not unreasonable having regard to 
the balance between those circumstances [the seven availing] and any 
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detriment to the public or to persons not party to the agreement…resulting or likely 
to result from the operation of the restriction".259 I emphasise this to 
highlight that in essence decisions as to whether a trade practice was 
'restrictive' had some consideration as to the affect on the market and yet 
judicial discretion outweighs this via a broad 'tailpiece' of "any detriment 
to the public".  
 
[60] In Re Yarn Spinners Agreement it was found that the price of yarn was 
higher than it would have been on the free-market.260 To avail this was 
the considerable localised unemployment that would result from ending 
the scheme,261 approximately 100,000 people in eleven areas.262 Notable 
of the courts political statements is the following finding;263  
We are satisfied that the industry can and ought to be made smaller and 
more compact…We cannot see why price invasion [from imports] is a bad 
thing or something which ought to be prevented; it is only one form of 
normal trade competition…Competition in quality is no doubt a benefit, 
but the removal of the restrictions would not prevent it. [Regarding 
unemployment]…But we are clear that once we have reached a conclusion 
of fact, it is our duty to disregard the consequences of our findings.  
 
[61] That the use of judges to make "…political and economic decisions was 
widely criticised in 1956"264 is hardly surprising. That eight years later the 
same court's jurisdiction was extended by the Resale Prices Act 1964 
(UK) 265  is even less surprising as the decisions that the court made 
(essentially trade liberalising in Re Yarn Spinners) should they have been 
made by the Minister would have been deeply unpopular in the 
electorate but necessary for the economy overall. The Lord Chancellor, 
Lord Gardiner, that year referred to the Court and noted "…the 
increasing practice in the last ten years of employing Her Majesty's 
Judges to perform tasks other than their ordinary tasks" and then added 
"I am not quite clear whether Her Majesty's Judges have any special 
qualifications to determine what are really socio-economic question, but 
they have done well".266 It is a trend that the judiciary has continued to 
excel at not just in areas of commerce, and do not shy away from. 
 
[62] Griffith points to doubts regarding the infringement of judicial purity, 
the foray into the political arena, trade agreements, and concludes that 
the Restrictive Practices Court may have provided some precedent in 
                                                 
259 Section 21(1) (final clause). 
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judicial involvement in the field of industrial relations.267 More so than 
providing precedent it is an example of judicial expansion in not only the 
regulating trade conduct (as opposed to contractual terms), which is not 
a traditional judicial function, but also Parliament expecting of them to 
preform 'other than their ordinary tasks' more generally i.e. public policy 
regulation. In 1956 there exists a clear devolution of regulation from the 
House to the Court via the term 'public benefit'. This phrase in a judicial 
setting is not unusual and indeed in the area of tort law and the duty of 
care it is bread and butter,268 but it is the context of its operation which 
is noteworthy. 269  Who better than to decide a politically unpalatable 
decision than a judge who is only disparately constitutionally responsive 
to the democratic will? But why is a judge deciding if free trade is for pro 
bono public? Is the judge any better qualified to do so than the politician? 
If the judge is just as qualified, than as Griffith argues, they must also be 
political actors in adjudicating economic questions of 'public benefit' and 
in carrying out this regulatory function. 
 
The authority for the judges on the Restrictive Practices Court to make decisions 
came from Parliament, a devolution, and yet without that legislative grant it is 
hard to found the power on any constitutional ground. Trade, in the Re Yarn 
Spinners example, is the realm of the executive. One academic noted in 1960 that 
this separate court was a "unique experiment"270 in a discrete area of law. In 1956 
it was considered responsible for a ‘special court’ to be established, for fear that a 
normal Court of Queens Bench would be ‘tainted’ were it to make economic 
decisions in the public interest. Now, however, the separation requirement does 
not exist; all courts are equally suited to regulate in what was once considered 
demarcated special areas.271. The Lord Chancellor noted at the final reading of 
the bill that it was "…an example of the dynamic use of the law" and "…one 
which provides for those affected the best machinery for arriving at the truth and 
reaching justice which the world has so far devised".272 The conceptualisation of 
                                                 
267 Griffith The Politics of the Judiciary above n 207, at 41. 
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specific right of appeal exists to a non-specialised High Court: Patents Act 2013, s 214. Litigation at first 
instance can be conducted before the Intellectual Property Office of New Zealand at significant costs 
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272 (1956) 199 GBPD HL 350. 
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truth and justice has also changed; what is 'truth' was once factual, now it is court 
policy making, regulating social conduct. 273  Courts in a dispute between the 
Crown, acting on behalf of the aggregate public, and private businessman (the 
restrictive practice) now decide the correct/just public interest of that agreement. 
The courts are apparently the best machinery for doing so, even though such 
question is political in nature. Audi alteram partem,274 where the other side is now 
the public at large and the judicial decision is no longer one just of the fact of 
record and correct law but regulatory due to its "… capacity for standard-
setting… [And the] capacity for behavior-modification to change the state of the 
system". 275  Therefore the regulatory mechanism extends far beyond rights 
adjudication in the constitutional arena, and in commerce, the operation of the 
mechanism as in lis' constitutional, is political in nature.   
  
                                                 
273 Valerie Morse v The Police above n 28: where the Supreme Court decided that the behavior – burning the 
flag on ANZAC day, was socially acceptable, as it did not meet threshold of the charge of 'offensive 
behavior'. 
274 A fundamental principle of natural justice; 'listen to the other side', or 'let the other side be heard'. 
275 Hood et al The Government of Risk above n 90, at 23. 
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V Illustration: Judicial Review as Juridical 
Political Regulation  
 
"The Orthodox View"  
Standard public law texts do not usually admit the relationship between 
law and political science… the majority do their utmost to separate law 
from its political context. The dominant view has been that law is not a 
branch of political science, a view accepted by lawyers and political 
scientists alike.276  
                                    Harlow and Rawlings Law and Administration (1997) 
[63] An exposition of a new judicial regulatory mechanism focusing on rights 
and regulating constitutional norms would be lacking if it did not end 
without touching on Judicial Review. Judicial review is the ultimate form 
of judicial regulation over public functionaries. The core rational of 
Judicial Review in the twenty-first-century is summarized as "the 
reasonable and political judge upholding the rule of law".277 Professor 
Waldron comments that the establishment of the NZ Supreme Court 
"has not lead to anything remotely like a judicial revolution"278 and that 
"it has not approached [Rights/BORA matters] in the excess of activist 
enthusiasm that some politicians expected."279 This is not to say that in 
the aforementioned regulatory exposition society should "underestimate 
the importance of straightforward business-as-usual affirmations of the 
rule of law by our courts, even when that does not involve the 
pyrotechnics of judicial review". 280  Lord Cooke has highlighted "the 
historical fact that what is now called judicial review long preceded 
democracy[/parliament]…"281 Judicial Review, or regulating the rule of 
law, was a political exercise long before there were elected politicians. 
Judicial review is not just political but is regulatory in nature. Now as 
such review commonly focuses on judges reviewing actions of the 
executive branch, or public functionaries carrying out the policies of 
politicians, it is no longer controversial to reject the orthodox view and 
label judicial review a political exercise, even if traditional notions of an 
apolitical judicial function would find this recognition "unpalatable".282   
 
[64] Detached separation between political and judicial spheres, to the 
English orthodoxy, was originally considered to buttress rule of law 
                                                 
276 Harlow and Rawlings Law and Administration above n 236, at 1. 
277 Timothy Andrew Orville Endicott Administrative Law (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) 
at 66. 
278 Waldron "Forward" above n 102, at vii. 
279 Above at xi. 
280 Above at xi. 
281 Lord Cooke "The Road Ahead for the Common Law" above n 75, at 275. 
282 As above. 
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arguments, as "legal ideas were invisible in the elaboration of political 
argument".283 This gave the former purity and legitimacy. Regulatory 
scholars Hancher and Moran concluded in the late 1980's that "In the 
UK especially, law has not been viewed as the great interpreter of 
politics".284 Hansard was not to be cited in Court even on matters of 
Parliaments intent, and this position only changed in the early 1990's.285 
This illogical separation between legal and political spheres was idealistic, 
false and flawed as the 'spheres' where never distinct. This purist 
'separation' of politics and law led to the above conclusions of regulatory 
scholars Hancher and Moran, Wade criticises the purists;286  
But if the price of preserving the purity of constitutional law is that one 
must ignore the political pros and cons of what are, after all our most 
essential laws, then I would say that the price is too high and the lack of 
realism is excessive. This is the world in which political scientists and 
economists have to live in any case 
With respect to the Hancher and Moran the view that law was not, and 
should not be, an interpreter of politics, in their regulatory field has lead 
to a lack of development of a judicial regulatory theory sitting outside of 
the discrete grounds of judicial review. Judicial Review is inherently a 
political exercise, regulatory in nature and room exists for a judicial 
regulatory mechanism, as argued in this paper, to develop along rights 
and constitutional grounds separate from judicial review. Judicial review 
as a form of regulation emphasises the reasonableness of the 
administrators' action, 287  whereas the judicial regulatory mechanism 
looks to the wider constitutional and rights implications of judicial 
adjudication – especially in cases which are not judicial review cases such 
as Taylor or Valerie Morse.  
 
[65] It is a classical liberal ideal that judges are to act as arbiters between 
citizens and the state, 288  and this administrative law principle flows 
though to the regulatory mechanism. Throughout this paper I have used 
the example of a lis of distinction of which might be a lis between Citizen 
v State. Examples provided were Taylor and Valerie Morse. Neither were 
judicial review cases, however both were rights/constitutional and had 
the flavor of the judiciary checking legislative/executive power against 
rule of law principles. Griffith radically called into question the idea of 
apolitical legal behavior as "…the idea of apolitical law is itself 
                                                 
283 As above, citing Sir Cecil Car Concerning English Administrative Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1941) at 10-11. 
284 Hancher and Moran "Organizing regulatory space" above n 43, at 65. 
285 Pepper v Hart [1993] AC 593 (HL) at 638-639, 644-649. 
286  Sir William Wade Hamlyn Lectures Thirty-Second Series: Constitutional Fundamentals (Stevens & Sons, 
Lincoln's Inn, 1989) at 2.  
287 In any sense or use of the word political; of or relating to the affairs of people, the government, country. 
288 Harlow and Rawlings Law and Administration above n 236, at 3. 
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political"289 yet there is a seemingly inherent conflict with judges acting 
simultaneously as purely neutral 'legal' arbiters and as political actors in 
both judicial review and by extension in judicial regulation in further 
fields. Intrinsic in the rule of law is the separation between judicial and 
political powers, 290  and ascribing to the judiciary political powers in 
regulation is an apparent conflict. Yet by comparison, in tort law political 
statements can subsist under the guise of 'policy' arguments. This 
questions the term 'politics', and perhaps with regards judicial regulation 
we should think of the word de novo. Indeed even in a lis outside of the 
constitutional realm, scope can be found for legitimate judicial policy 
making - in the form of regulations;291 
Law plays an important role in shaping political behavior in liberal 
democracies, but it is often assigned an especially significant role with 
respect judicial behavior.  
 
[66] Lord Denning, MR, in a case concerning the duty of care in a tort 
lacking any precedent decided, with "refreshing candor"292 that, "In the 
end", "it will be found to be a question of policy, which we, as judges, 
have to decide".293 Therefore is the rule of law in administrative law 
incorrectly associated with the idea of a politically neutral judiciary and is 
it all the more important that when the judiciary regulates conduct we 
consider it as such? The answer is yes as "the price is too high and the 
lack of realism is excessive" by not recognising the key political-
regulatory function of judiciary. 294  The high price is akin to having 
blinkers on at a crossroads. Thomas J recognised this, concluding that a 
shift in approach is both needed and expected by the community; 295  
The permanence of those principles and the enduring nature of the values 
underlying them are in danger of being obscured if the shift in judicial 
approach is not anchored in the changing needs or expectations of the 
community. 
Judicial regulation, its development and its recognition, is commensurate 
with the new judicial résumé, society expects and calls for "Independent 
and active judges",296 and in turn judges fulfill the role. The 18th century 
guise of judges simply declaring law, as opposed to making it, is 
                                                 
289 Griffith The Politics of the Judiciary above n 207; Harlow and Rawlings Law and Administration above n 236, 
at 3. 
290 At 3; Michael Oakeshott Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays (Oxford-Blackwell, Oxford 1962) at 41. 
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296 At 378. 
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premised on the judiciary being politically neutral. 297  It is a premise 
which the judiciary do not ascribe to, and nor does society expect them 
to. 
 
[67] A jurisprudential scholar postulated from high theory that "The courts 
are the capitals of law's empire, and judges are its princes". 298  This 
creates an image not unlike judicial review, and the classical English 
viewpoint, even expanded to judicial regulation, that "[the rule of law is] 
somehow neutral and impartial, 'above' both ruler and party politics"299 
withers away. And “Today no apology is needed for talking openly about 
judicial policy”300 with regards both judicial review, a traditional form of 
judicial regulation on conduct, and the new judicial regulatory theory as 
described in this paper. Common law courts, like other classical 
regulators, regulate directly and the judiciary regulates specifically in the 
rights and constitutional arena wider than the lis in particular inter se 
disputes. An exposition of Judges as regulators would not be possible 
without recognition of the burgeoning taxonomy of administrative law, 
or a realisation of the political judiciary. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
297 Harlow and Rawlings Law and Administration above n 236, at 3; See also H Laski A Grammar of Politics 
(5th ed, HarperCollins, NY, 1967) chp 10 note 1. 
298 Dworkin Laws Empire above n 132, at 407. 
299 Harlow and Rawlings Law and Administration above n 236, at 3 
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VI  Concluding remarks: Judicial Regulation 
part of  New Zealand' s Constitutional Norms 
 
[68] If the NZ constitution is a "…reflection of our national culture"301 then 
by circular definition our national culture is informed by our judicial 
regulatory mechanism. As our national culture evolves then so to is our 
'open-textured' constitution amended. Intrinsic in the judicial regulatory 
mechanism is that courts exercise substantial regulatory power, effecting 
society, far in excess of the lis. The regulatory mechanism is the 
protection of aggregate fundamental rights through legal actions. This 
regulatory mechanism can only be recognised with an understanding of 
the inherent political nature of the judicial regulatory enterprise.  
 
[69] National culture is influenced by its people, its regulation and vice versa. 
Matthew Palmer suggests that there are ten people, influential 
constitutional actors, who interpret and greatly influence NZ's 
Constitution.302 He is not alone in expressing such a viewpoint. Ten 
years earlier in a predictably titled essay, The Suggested Revolution Against the 
Crown, Cooke P identified one reason why England would see a King 
William V on the throne;303 
…that not for any juristic reason but simply because, as a writer in The 
Times, Nigella Lawson, put it: "Suspicion rather than hope is the national 
characteristic. Most people think that turning Britain into a republic will 
never turn the British into republicans."  
The Nigella Lawson he referred to was, in 1995, not known yet for her 
culinary prowess but as a Sunday Times writer and the daughter of Lord 
Nigel Lawson, the Tory Chancellor under Thatcher. Cooke P gives great 
weight the young Ms. Lawson's constitutional insights and to the sway 
her opinion had over the English public. Matthew Palmer is correct that 
there are indeed key constitutional actors in NZ, he is specific in 
identifying ten, and yet of those who regulate our national culture – the 
norms and constitutional actors in the wider sense, there are many more.  
 
[70] There is a dilemma inherent in the NZ constitution which the regulatory 
mechanism goes some way to solving. "Whether there are limits to the 
lawmaking power of the New Zealand Parliament has not [yet] been 
authoritatively determined", 304  and throughout this paper I have 
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described parliament as 'ostensibly sovereign' in constitutional and rights 
matters. It is a popular legal truism in the USA that "we are under a 
Constitution, but the Constitution is what the judges say it is"305 due to 
the documentary fundamentalism intrinsic the judiciaries interpretative 
role of the US Constitution. That is also a realisation even more 
applicable to the NZ legal landscape then most NZ lawyers would admit, 
as, regarding judicial regulation of constitutional norms, "the systems [In 
the US and in NZ] seem to be operating in much the same way".306 The 
NZ exists in constitutional dilemma is apparent in the views of the NZ 
Chief Justice, "In New Zealand at least, claims of judicial supremacisism 
seem rather odd"307 but that by and large "Parliamentary sovereignty is 
an inadequate theory of our constitution[...]". This does not mean that 
when adjudicating constitutional questions the NZ judiciary could not be 
activist – but this must be measured against the "somewhat 
indeterminate nature of the constitutional enterprise in New 
Zealand".308 I suggest that the judicial regulatory mechanism is a better 
viewpoint. 
 
[71] Professor Joseph has argued that Parliamentary Sovereignty is an 
inadequate explanation of the relationship between Courts and the 
Executive/Legislature within NZ's Westminster democracy. 309  The 
Constitution is not a power play between political and judicial forces, the 
reality is that the Courts accept Parliament's power to effect legal change 
through legislation and Parliament accepts the judicial power to adapt its 
legislation to the fact patters of the lis.310 This is, as Lord Woolf held, 
cognisant with the "wider constitutional principle of mutuality of respect 
between two constitutional sovereignties".311 In particular Joseph finds 
that the traditional model of parliamentary sovereignty can be reconciled 
with the expanded judicial functions under modern human rights 
instruments, such as BORA. Parliament has given the courts the 
responsibility to vindicate the rule of law and to protect citizens from 
unjustified interference. Thus the exercise of power sharing shows the 
                                                                                                                                            
Sovereignty in the 21st Century Organised by the Institute for Comparative and International Law at the 
University of Melbourne Australia 19th March, 2003). 
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Sons, 1908) (reprint, Kessinger Publishing, Montana, 2007) at 139. 
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307 At 24. 
308 Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey Palmer "Comparative Constitutional Law at Iowa: The New Zealand Constitution 
and the Power of Courts" (2006) 15 Transnatl Law Contemp Probl 551 at 552. 
309 Joseph "Parliament, the Courts, and the Collaborative Enterprise" above n 6, at 321. 
310 At 333. 
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different branches engaging in a "collaborative enterprise". 312  A 
recognition of the collaborative enterprise is necessary for judicial 
regulatory mechanism's theoretical development insofar as it is not 
viewed as illegitimate judicial supremacisism.  
 
[72] The NZ constitution, unwritten, evolving, falls to the judicial branch, the 
judicial mechanism, to be regulated, this is "the courts contribution".313 
It is a difficult question as to the courts legitimate exercise of judicial 
discretion and regulating outside the lis and inter se disputes. The judicial 
mechanism is in part wide variegated standard setting existing both 
inside and outside the lis. It operates within the exchange of a 'rights' 
market, where courts fulfill their role as the neutral adjudicator branch of 
government, but manifestly informed by constitutional norms. Standard 
setting is key in both regulatory function and regulatory definition.314 
The mechanism, and thus the common law courts as regulators, under 
the NZ model of an unwritten constitution is an exercise in the 
discretionary judicial function "allow[ing] a distinction to be made 
between more or less preferred states of the system", what the system, 
the state or society is, and an extempore ability to "change the state of 
the system" by behavior modification, either incrementally or writ 
large.315 In not every case, will a judicial decision, be judicial regulation. 
Many cases together can act as incremental movement towards the 
setting of new standard, whereas others – most clearly those in the 
BORA or constitutional realm will be explicit.  
 
[73] The limits of common-law courts as regulators are defined by the courts 
capacity for behavior modification, to change the state of the system. 
Common law courts, like other classical regulators, regulate directly. The 
judiciary regulates specifically in the rights and constitutional arena wider 
than the lis in particular inter se disputes. 
 
[74] This paper is by no means an attempt to observe that Parliament and the 
Executive, do not regulate, that is a fortiori, or that regulation is the 
exclusive realm of the judiciary. It seeks to expose and address a new 
typology of judicial regulation through the mechanism, of the courts. 
Whilst this authors' concept of a judicial regulatory mechanism may 
seem limitless, it is restricted in the limits, which exist, in the legal system 
for which the mechanism operates. In NZ Parliament is supreme up to a 
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point, the Courts and Judiciary often question this.316 Our Sovereign in 
right - her heirs and successors 317  via a Governor-General have 
prerogative and reserve powers, and citizens have fundamental rights 
existing both in statute 318  and pre-existing in common law inherited 
from the Laws of England.319 The relationship between the Crown and 
Maori is governed by the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.320 These 
are but a small selection of NZ's "open textured" 321  constitutional 
norms. Joseph is convincing that there exists collaboration between the 
two branches (Government/Judiciary) which "transcends the language 
of Leviathan – of sovereignty, supremacy and subordination". 322  It is 
mostly for the judiciary to manage the domain of rights as a regulatory 
exercise, "the legislative role of the Courts is interstitial…[Courts] effect 
just and efficient legislative outcomes in ways that reconcile the 
institutional values of the legal system".323 This is not to say Parliament 
does not play a large role and might fundamentally alter the texture or 
indeed remove in entirety any one or all of them, including abrogating 
parts of the common law. Should Parliament do this, or NZ move down 
the road of republicanism, there would be such a fundamental change in 
the NZ system that indeed judicial regulation would be limited, but only 
because the underlying fundamental norm of the system has changed.324 
A new system of law in NZ would take its place;325 a new constitutional 
makeup and a cognisant new judicial regulatory mechanism would 
develop.326 The regulatory role of courts in NZ is part of the security of 
NZ's constitutional balance.  
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